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Abstract 
 
Even though maritime safety regulations provide an immense source of 
knowledge for the whole shipping industry, it is recognized that these rules have been 
developed reacting to serious disasters, and that their further improvements are still 
indispensible. Thus, in the last decade, it became clear that maritime safety should be 
addressed proactively rather than waiting for accidents to happen in order to elaborate 
regulations that help avoiding the recurrence of the same events.  
 
Accordingly, since the end of the 20 century, new subject matters such as 
“Formal Safety Assessment”, “Goal Based Standards” and “Alternative Design and 
Arrangements” continuously appear between the items of high importance in the 
IMO’s agenda for the development of its rule-making and application framework. 
 
The dissertation provides a review of state-of-the-art related to the “non 
traditional” regulatory framework, and makes an explanatory an exploratory study of 
the different concepts that materialize the proactive approach to maritime safety, it 
also investigates the potential benefits and contribution of risk assessment techniques 
to this approach. In addition, this work identifies some strengths and weaknesses of 
both proactive and traditional safety approaches, and presents an outlook on the 
ongoing work at IMO and the most recent results achieved to date.  
 
Finally, the incentives for the development of a risk based ship inspection 
regime and the basic foundations for this concept are examined as an expected future 
step for the development of the current proactive maritime safety regime. 
 
Keywords: Proactive maritime safety; Formal Safety Assessment; Goal-Based 
Standards; Alternative Design and Arrangements; Prescriptive Standards; 
Performance-Based Standards; Risk-Based Approach; Risk-Based Inspection. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
I.1. General Context  
 
The move toward proactive and risk-based approaches in safety regulation is 
already well underway in most sensitive industries. At the same time, the utilization of 
such scientific methods in the maritime sector is still in the first stages of development 
and has little impact on policy formulation.   
 
In fact, traditional maritime safety regulations have mainly grown in a reactive 
way, with lessons drawn up from disasters and catastrophes constituting the primary 
motivators for regulation improvement. These regulations still constitute an 
indispensible base of technical knowledge; nevertheless, it becomes less effective 
because of rapidly changing designs and increasingly innovative building techniques, 
especially for “knowledge-intensive” and “safety-critical” ships. 
 
Hence, in the last decade, the maritime sector initiated the modernization of its 
regulatory framework, in order to overcome the limitations posed by the traditional 
safety regime. Three main objectives for the development of the maritime safety 
regime have been identified and will be investigated in this dissertation; they consist of:  
 
• Supporting the development of regulations - Formal Safety 
Assessment (FSA): The FSA is a methodology, based on risk analysis and 
cost benefit analysis, adopted by the IMO in order to improve the 
development of maritime safety and environmental protection rules by 
providing a support to the decision-making.  
• Promoting the innovation - Alternative design and arrangements for 
fire protection: SOLAS regulation II-2/17 permits the approval of Non-
prescriptive designs, if it is proved that their safety level is at least equivalent 
to the safety level of prescriptive design. 
• Developing standards according to safety objectives - Goal-based 
standards (GBS): a new approach which is regularly appearing on the top of 
the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) meetings agenda since 2004, and 
which has been, very recently, developed to be introduced in the next SOLAS 
Convention amendments. 
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  These objectives constitute the backbone of the new approach to maritime 
safety, adopted by IMO. Thus, the future development of these concepts would be 
crucial for the enhancement of safety levels and for improving the picture of the 
shipping industry, which suffered from unacceptable fatalities rates and catastrophic 
environmental pollution in the last decades, mainly because of unforeseen failures. 
 
The evolution toward a proactive regime is mainly characterized by two major 
elements, namely greater flexibility, and more transparency in setting safety objectives. 
In fact, instead of defining specific prescriptive rules, the new approaches state, 
quantitatively or qualitatively, holistic safety objectives, goals and performance 
criteria. Moreover, the concept of risk is usually introduced in an explicit or implicit 
way, during the development and the implementation of the regulations. However, this 
new tendency raises a certain number of issues, mainly related to uncertainties, reduced 
confidence and the role of experts in the decision-making process. 
 
I.2. Legal Background  
 
There are various provisions in different IMO instruments and guidelines that 
promote the development of proactive and risk based approaches, and emphasize the 
use of objective and performance based alternatives in lieu of prescriptive regulations; 
the following illustrate some of these provisions: 
 
1. The FSA process was introduced in 1999 to support the IMO rule making 
process. It mainly uses risk management and cost/benefits principles for 
evaluating various safety alternatives. Subsequently, this process is being 
progressively introduced at various other levels, such as evaluating safety 
criteria or for the approval of alternative design and arrangements. 
 
2. The ongoing developments of the GBS at IMO would result in a new 
regulatory framework for shipping, especially after the expected 
amendments to the SOLAS Convention, which would make the GBS 
standards mandatory for new oil tankers and bulk carriers. These 
amendments will reinforce the philosophy of risk-based approaches in the 
design and approval of alternative arrangements. 
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3. Various IMO instruments permit approving equivalents and alternatives 
design in lieu of prescriptive requirements in many areas of ship design and 
construction, which can pave the way for risk-based approaches. For 
instance, the 2002 amended SOLAS regulation II-2/17 and MSC/Circ.1002 
provide the methodology and guidelines for the approval of alternative 
design and arrangements for fire safety arrangements. 
 
4. Future developments of IMO instruments are focusing on the revision of 
rules and methodologies, for promoting the introduction of innovative 
alternative design and arrangements for machinery and electrical 
installations and life saving appliances, which would emphasize the 
importance of proactive and risk-based approach for setting the future 
maritime safety criteria and objectives. 
 
Thus, proactive and risk-based approaches are currently being introduced at 
many levels within the IMO regulatory framework. Accordingly the development of 
these concepts would constitute a major challenge for maritime safety for the future 
decades. 
 
I.3. Objectives and structure of the dissertation 
 
The main objectives of this dissertation are as follows: 
 
• Identify the principle limitations of the traditional maritime safety 
regime and determine the incentives for new approaches; 
• Investigate the safety approaches adopted in sensitive industries other 
than the maritime sector; 
• Identify the characteristics of the proactive approach to maritime safety 
and their relationship with risk management principles 
• Making a comparative analysis between performance based and 
prescriptive regulation by the examination of their respective strengths and 
weaknesses; 
• Investigate the various aspects of the new proactive maritime safety 
regime (FSA process, alternative design and GBS methodologies); 
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• Provide a basis of knowledge, techniques and methodologies related to 
the various concepts of the proactive approach to maritime safety; 
• Finally, presenting the incentive for the development of a risk-based 
ship inspection regime and drawing the basic lines that would constitute such 
system. 
 
Accordingly, after this Introduction, the second chapter will discuss the 
limitations of the traditional safety regime and the incentives for a new safety approach. 
Then a comparative analysis between performance based and prescriptive regulations 
and the safety regimes in sensitive industries, such as the nuclear and offshore sectors 
will be examined in the third chapter.  
 
The fourth chapter will be dedicated to the investigation of the role of risk 
principles for developing a proactive safety regime. Then the principles of the FSA 
process and its importance for the new maritime rule-making methodology will be 
critically reviewed in the fifth chapter. Subsequently, the sixth chapter will cover the 
proactive safety compliance concepts, such as GBS and alternative design and 
arrangements. 
 
Finally, the benefits and incentives for a risk-based ship inspection regime and 
the basic lines for developing such system will be presented in the seventh chapter. 
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Chapter II: Aspects of the traditional maritime safety 
 
II.1. Brief history of the sources of maritime regulation 
 
The first recorded mentions of maritime law go back to the Babylonian Code of 
Hammurabi, especially related to the bottomry and collision avoidance; safety was not 
considered as a matter of public apprehension, and accidents were regarded to be 
inevitable and act of the Gods (Mukherjee, 2002). Though, the first initiatives for the 
regulation of maritime safety were operated within a private framework. Indeed, the 
first classification societies were created in the 19th century under the impulse of the 
maritime insurers in order to give them information on the quality of the ships and 
their equipment.  
 
In this context, classification societies imagined and conceived a system of 
ships’ inspection which allowed them to deliver class notation attesting the degree of 
confidence which can be granted to the ships. With the origin, these notations, rather 
complex, covered the hull of the boats. This system of class notation mainly covered 
the ship’s hull, the quality of the sails and was also interested in the competence of the 
master and crews. 
 
By the end of the 19th century, dialogue attempts took place between the main 
maritime nations, such as Great Britain and France, particularly to establish common 
rules for collision avoidance in the English Channel. Subsequently, the “s/s Titanic” 
catastrophe in 1912 accelerated the process for the creation of international maritime 
safety standards. This catastrophe promoted the first international conference on the 
safety of human life at sea, which led to the first International Maritime Convention, 
SOLAS 1914 entering into force in 1919. 
 
However, the most important tuning in the maritime safety regulation history 
was marked by the adoption in 1948 of the Convention creating the International 
Maritime Organization IMO (originally called IMCO), through a United Nations 
Conference held in Geneva. This Convention entered into force on March 17th, 1958, 
and the new Organization was inaugurated on January, 6th 1959.  
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The purposes of the Organization, as described in the Article 1(a) of the 
Convention, are:  
to provide machinery for co-operation among Governments in the field of 
governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds 
affecting shipping engaged in international trade, to encourage and facilitate 
the general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning 
maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of marine 
pollution from ships (IMO, 2009).  
 
However, tragic accidents such as the “Herald of free enterprise”, 
Scandinavian Star and Estonia, together with environmental disasters “Torrey 
Canyon”, “Amoco Cadiz” and “Exxon Valdez” increased the public awareness and 
focus on maritime safety. Consequently, the IMO endeavors to find quick and 
adequate solutions, which would both prevent, on a case by case basis, the same 
accidents to happen again and that would cure its reputation and credibility, damaged 
by the recurrence of accidents like those affecting bulk carriers in the nineties. 
 
In fact, despite the great advances in maritime safety achieved since the 
creation of the IMO, it is continuously target of varied and severe controversial 
criticisms related to its standard-setting functions. For instance, it has been accused of: 
• Being an administrative body where political bureaucrats outnumber 
technicians;  
• Producing too many complicated regulations, which are difficult to 
implement, especially by developing countries; however, it is not given any 
instrument to control the implementation of the regulations by these countries;  
• Failing to eradicate substandard ship’s, while it is not given any 
possibility of action against Flag States that accept to register such vessels;  
• Acting in most cases after a disaster. In fact, most of the IMO instruments 
have been generated after catastrophes, as illustrated in Table.1 (Boisson, 1999). 
All these criticisms, amplified by the people’s increased safety and 
environmental awareness, urged the IMO to find solutions that meet the new maritime 
safety challenges, mainly by modernizing its traditional rule making approaches. 
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Table 01: Contribution of Maritime disasters to the improvements of maritime safety  
Disaster Place / Date Impact 
TITANIC 
 
1502 fatalities 
Cape race, 
Newfoundland 
April, 1912 
SOLAS Conference of 1914 
1st SOLAS convention 
The North Atlantic Protocol on Safety Navigation; 
Watertight bulkhead 
Radiotelegraphy 
Lifesaving appliances 
TORREY CANYON 
 
Spill of 119,000 tons 
of crude oil 
Scilly Islands 
March, 18th 1967 
1967: creation of the IMO Legal Committee 
1969: CLC Convention 
1969: International Convention related to the Intervention 
on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties. 
1971: Fund Convention 
1973: MARPOL Convention 
ARGO MERCHANT 
 
Oil spill: 27,000 tons 
Cape Cod, 
Massachusetts 
December, 14th 
1976 
March 1977: announcement by the US of unilateral 
measures on tankers safety 
1978 SOLAS Convention Protocol 
1978 MARPOL Convention Protocol: segregated ballast 
tanks 
AMOCO CADIZ 
 
Oil spill: 228,000 tons 
Off Brittany 
March, 16th 1978 
TANIO 
 
Oil spill: 11,000 tons 
English channel 
March, 7th 1980 
May 1978: IMO Council initiative for the improvement 
of tankers safety (duplication of steering gear control 
systems) 
Speeding up entry into force of SOLAS and MARPOL 
Protocols: 
May 1981SOLAS Protocol 
October 1983: MARPOL Protocol 
1982: Paris MoU on Ports State Control 
HERALD OF FREE 
ENTEPRISE 
 
193 fatalities 
Zeebrugge 
March, 6th 1987 
August 1987: UK measures to improve Ro-Ro ferries 
safety 
November 1987: 1st IMO resolution on Safety 
Management of shipping companies 
April 1988: 1st package of SOLAS amendments on 
monitoring systems 
October 1988: 2nd package of SOLAS amendments on 
damage stability 
SCANDINAVIAN 
STAR 
 
158 fatalities 
North sea 
April, 7th 1990 
November 1991: IMO Res. A.680 on Safety Management 
of shipping companies 
November 1993: IMO Res. A.741 on ISM Code 
May 1994: ISM Code becomes Mandatory after SOLAS 
Conference 
EXXON VALDEZ 
 
Spill of 37,000 tons of 
crude oil 
Alaska 
March, 24th 1989 
August 1990: US Oil Pollution Act 
March 1992: MARPOL amendments:  
        - Reg 13F: Double hull for new oil tankers 
        - Reg 13G: ESP for existing oil tankers 
ESTONIA 
 
850 FATALITIES 
Baltic sea 
September, 28th 
1994 
November 1995: SOLAS Conference, adoption of new 
regulation II-1/8-1 on damage stability for existing ferries 
February 1996: Stockholm agreement on specific stability 
requirements for ferries operating in North Europe 
ERIKA 
 
Oil spill: 20,000 tons 
Bay of Biscay 
December, 12th 
1999 
March & December 2000: EU ERIKA 1 and ERIKA 2 
packages 
Phase out of single hull tankers, creation of EMSA, 
Reinforcement of PSC 
Prestige 
 
Oil spill: 63,000 tons 
Cape Finisterre, 
Galicia 
Nov. , 13th 2002 
May 2003: Adoption of FUND II 
December 2008: EU ERIKA 3 Package, ship-owners and 
Flag States obligation in the event of oil pollution 
Chantelauve, G. (2006). Evaluation des risques et réglementation de la sécurité: cas du secteur 
maritime – Tendances et Applications. Thèse de Doctorat : Institut National des Sciences 
Appliquées de Lyon 
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II.2. The actors of shipping industry  
 
Catastrophes such the “Erika” accident, reveal the complexity of the modern 
shipping industry in terms of interrelation between different actors that have an 
influence on maritime safety. In fact, the “BEA mer” investigation report on this 
accident states that the Maltese flagged vessel was owned by a Maltese shipping 
company which belongs to two other Liberian companies, managed by an Italian 
management company in Ravenna, manned by an Indian manning company in 
Mumbai and chartered by a Bahamian company (BEA mer, 2000). The report gives 
much deeper details, but this example is not unique in the modern maritime business, 
which is completely different from the old traditional image of the sea trade, where the 
owner of the vessel was himself the captain and the rest of the crew were his closest 
partners.  
 
Consequently, the application of international safety standards became 
influenced by multiple actors (see Figure 1), the following Table 2 describes the role of 
the main ones (Kristiansen, 2005): 
 
Table 2: Influence of maritime safety Actors 
Actors Influence on ship safety 
Ship builder • Design of the vessel and set the technical standards 
Shipowner • Decide on the degree of application of international standards (Evasive, 
compliance or safety); 
• Decides on the crewing composition and standard; 
• Decision making on all organizational and operational safety policies. 
Cargo owner • Pays for the transport operation, thus decide on the quality of the selected 
ship for the service. 
Flag State • Overall control of the vessel, its crew and the application of 
national/international standards. 
Classification 
societies 
• Control of technical standards during the ship construction and exploitation; 
• Undertake some or the majority of Flag States’ control responsibility. 
Port State • Responsible for safety in the Port and its approach; 
• Control the safety levels of the ships and in extreme case may detain or 
deny the access of a ship to its port. 
 
 10
 
Chapter II: Aspects of the traditional maritime safety 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II.3. Classification rules vs. statutory regulation 
 
Because of its international character, the shipping industry is subject to a 
multitude of rules and regulations, technical standards and codes of best practices, 
either under mandatory or voluntary basis, and public or private origins. Mainly, two 
types of maritime safety regulations can be distinguished, namely, statutory regulations 
and classification rules. 
 
 
Figure 1: Principal actors of the maritime safety 
? Statutory regulation 
 
Historically, the purpose of the statutory regulations was, initially, the 
safeguard of the human life at sea and then, following several ecological catastrophes, 
the environmental protection. In the 21st century, the problem of terrorism and 
maritime security also became a subject of concern. 
 
Flag states are responsible for the enforcement of statutory regulations which 
are mainly dictated by international conventions developed by the IMO. Accordingly, 
States can choose to exert their control related to the statutory surveys directly, or to 
delegate their functions (entirely or partially) to recognized organizations.  
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? Classification rules 
The classification rules generally cover the solidity of the ship’s structure, 
construction materials, principal and auxiliary machinery, control systems, electric 
installations, cargo installations, systems of fire detection and extinguishing and the 
ship stability. They cover imperative standards that constitute conditions for the class 
attribution, in addition to the less constraining provisions consisting in technical notes 
which prepare for future requirements of classification. Classification rules are mainly 
divided into new buildings and ships in service rules. 
 
? Overlapping between statutory and classification rules 
 
Historically, the classification rules were primarily concerned by the risk 
evaluation for the ship and its cargo, much more than the safeguard of the human life 
at sea, which was the purpose of the SOLAS Convention. It constituted the main 
difference between the statutory and classification rules. However, these two fields are 
closely dependent on each other, because the effectiveness of classification rules for 
the ship construction will certainly contribute to the general safety framework.  
 
Moreover, these two fields are now much more closely dependent as the IMO 
imposes the recourse to classification rules, especially by SOLAS Chapter II-1 
regulation 3-1, which states that “… ships shall be designed, constructed and 
maintained in compliance with the structural, mechanical and electrical requirements 
of a classification society”.  The overlapping between the classification system and 
some IMO Conventions is illustrated in figure 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Overlapping between some IMO conventions and classification rules 
Chantelauve, G. (2006). Evaluation des risques et réglementation de la sécurité: cas du 
secteur maritime – Tendances et Applications. Thèse de Doctorat : Institut National des 
Sciences Appliquées de Lyon 
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II.4. Problems of the traditional maritime regulation 
   
Regulation is an indispensable factor of maritime safety. However, the 
international maritime regulation is heavily criticized because of its complexity, its 
volume, diversity and incompleteness. 
 
? Volume of maritime regulation  
 
The huge number of regulations makes them difficult for States to interpret and 
implement. Mainly, there are two reasons for this heavy volume of regulations.  
 
First, after having been in competition with other UN organizations such as 
UNCTAD and ILO for the establishment of international maritime standards, today, 
the IMO find itself confronting other regional organizations in order to impose 
international standards. For instance, the US or the EU are not only adopting measures 
to interpret and harmonize the implementation of existing conventions, but they also 
elaborate their own mandatory directives on problems that are still not addressed on a 
universal scale, or even to rise the IMO standards to a higher level. 
 
Second, the quick pace of technical progress and the huge number of problems 
calling for urgent solutions, made the IMO using the tacit acceptance regularly to keep 
a close eye on the technical innovation and prevent the aging of its regulations. 
However, this instrument does not have only benefits, but also drawbacks. For instance, 
on certain occasions the quick pace of rules generating, created point saturation, and it 
became impossible for States to implement the huge amount of standards adopted. 
 
? Diversity of safety standards 
 
International safety regulations are extremely numerous and diverse; this 
diversity can be observed on three levels: 
- Firstly, public regulations comprise both technical and legal requirements. 
These two aspects require different procedures for their preparation, amendment and 
enforcement. For instance, an international convention may comprise both compulsory 
rules and recommendations which will be implemented at different degrees by States. 
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- Secondly, technical standards have different legal forces, depending on 
whether they are prescribed by conventions or resolutions. In the first case, the 
principle of “pacta sunt servanda” applies; but in the case of resolutions, some 
flexibility is left to the States’ legislators for the implementation process. 
- Finally, regulations may sometimes be technically precise but legally vague, 
because the texts are often reviewed and adjusted to ensure the broadest possible 
agreement. Consequently, certain rules are so vague that they leave the issue of 
implementation open to all kinds of interpretation. 
 
? Loopholes in safety rules 
 
Several IMO instruments have wide ranges of application, depending, for 
instance, on the type of navigation, registered tonnage and the age of the ship. 
Accordingly, these aspects are now used in a commercial context, to increase the 
shipowners’ incomes, at the expense of safety. For instance, container ships are 
increasing the over-deck cargo to decrease their gross-tonnage and other ships take 
profit of the “grand-father clauses” to implement lower safety standards. These 
Loopholes are now put in question for their impact on safety. 
 
In this context, Boisson (1999) states that: 
 
The safety laws, so difficult to understand and interpret, so 
complicated to implement and enforce, raise a new set of problems 
for those concerned with safety. This situation is disturbing the 
shipping industry. The harmful effects of over-regulation and the 
fragmentation of rules have been denounced. Difficulties arise from 
the fact that the international standards governing safety at sea are 
heterogeneous, many in number and incomplete. Another sources of 
anxiety is the increasing speed at which the law changes. Despite the 
proliferation of regulatory organizations, certain loopholes persist in 
the law. Overlapping and duplication of efforts to promote maritime 
safety continue in the absence of global co-ordination. 
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? Reactivity 
 
Maritime regulations have long time been criticized because of the reactive 
nature of its development, generally following catastrophes, also known as “regulation 
by the disasters”. The principal limits of this approach is that taking decisions with 
limited range of application after a crisis, resulted both in a complex regulation and an 
over-regulation, which have a prescriptive aspect that typically dictates the minimal 
technical or competence requirements. Consequently, a “compliance culture” has long 
time regulated the maritime sector, associated with a reduced capacity of innovation 
and initiative taking (Chantelauve, 2006). 
 
? Deterministic Principle 
 
Also, the traditional maritime rule-making is based upon a deterministic 
approach that mainly addresses technical systems or human elements. However, the 
solutions generated by this approach often remain incomplete, because of the over-
simplification made during the analysis process giving excessive weight to the 
technical and human factors (Boisson, 1996).  
 
Boisson (1999) states that for over a hundred and fifty years, maritime safety 
mainly relied on a deterministic philosophy, assuming that every event has a cause, 
and that the same causes produce the same effects. Consequently, maritime safety 
became a set of preventive measures based on malfunctions in the shipping industry, 
namely maritime accidents and incidents. This attitude is now criticized for being 
complex, permanently out of date, constantly failing to keep up with technological 
innovations, thus, inadequate to meet the overall challenges of maritime safety for 
providing a safe, efficient, environment friendly and highly competitive transportation 
mode.  
 
However, as response to such criticisms, Mr. Mitropoulos suggests that “the 
IMO manages to navigate a successful course between the proverbial “rock and a hard 
place” by working at whatever pace is appropriate for the issue in hand and the context 
within which it is being considered” (Mitropoulos, 2004). Thus, a wind of change in 
the safety regulations policy making was indispensible. 
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II.5. Chapter Conclusions 
 
This Chapter discussed traditional maritime regulation regime. It is important 
to notice that in the maritime sector, the prescriptive regulations played and continue to 
play an important role in the safety control.  Thus, the objective is not to call into 
question or to critisize the traditional maritime safety regulation framework, for several 
reasons such as:  
 
• In spite of apparent criticisms and dysfunctions, this existing legislation 
is a capital source of knowledge;  
• The development of such a regulation in the historical and international 
context of maritime safety was a necessary stage of consolidation;  
• The progressive evolution of maritime safety regime should find 
solutions to the current and foreseeable future problems. 
 
By reviewing the traditional maritime safety regime, the author is rather trying 
to identify possible dysfunctions that justify the needs for the recent evolutions. 
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III.1. general context 
In the previous chapter the indispensability of regulation for the maritime 
safety was exposed. Also, there was an attempt to present the problematic posed by 
traditional safety approach and the panoply of criticisms that addressed this approach, 
especially with regards to its reactive and prescriptive nature. Consequently, new 
safety approaches have been considered to overcome these loopholes, using more 
scientific tools such as risk science at the stages of rules making and application. 
 
Ideally, the new approach would at least meet the following expectations: 
 
• Provide solutions that respond to well defined hazards; 
• Incorporate the management aspects, by placing the responsibility for 
safety within the hands of the operators themselves; 
• Make benefit from recent technological, operational and managerial 
advances; 
• Give incentives for operators that should consider that safety is assisting 
them to achieve their corporate objectives (Kuo, 1999). 
• Provide a holistic safety approach that gives to regulation the flexibility to 
adapt to the quick pace of technological innovation. 
 
In this context, risk science has been introduced at two levels in the maritime 
safety regulation. First, at the stage of rule making thought the concept of Formal 
Safety Assessment (FSA) (IMO, 1997), and second, at the stage of the rules 
application, for instance, the introduction of the “alternative design” approach 
(SOLAS regulation II-2/17), or the Goal-based ship construction standards.  
 
These concepts will be thoroughly reviewed, but first two other “non-
maritime” alternatives to traditional safety approach have been selected in order to 
introduce the new regulation tendencies. Firstly, the nuclear industry, as it is the first 
sector using risk principles in its rule making (Lassagne, 2004), and secondly, the 
offshore safety approach because of the similarities between this industry and the 
maritime field. Then, a comparative review between prescriptive and performance-
based regulations will be presented in this chapter. 
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III.2. Nuclear sector: “Risk-informed” regulation approach 
 
When he was asked about the need to risk-inform regulations that are “good 
enough” for the safety and oversight of currently operating reactors, and even for the 
evolutionary and advanced reactor designs, Mr. Nils Diaz, Chairman of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC), replayed that: ““good enough” should not be our 
standard … ...when we have the know-how and the tools to create regulations that will 
allow us to incrementally incorporate the best scientific and technical information, and 
the best methods and approaches” (Diaz, 2004, p.03). 
 
The U.S. NRC was the origin for the developments of many risk analysis 
techniques in the seventies. Today, it is mostly recognized as the creator of a doctrine 
in the risk-based rules making, which is the risk-informed regulations. This approach is 
defined to be a regulatory decision-making that “represents a philosophy whereby risk 
insights are considered together with other factors to establish requirements that better 
focus licensee and regulatory attention on design and operational issues commensurate 
with their importance to public health and safety” (U.S.NRC, 2004, p.07). It can be 
explained by the use of the probability and consequences of an undesirable event to 
influence the regulations decision-making process. The framework for risk-informing a 
specific regulation is explained in Figure 3. 
  
This approach was initiated in 1995, when the NRC Policy Commission 
declared that the use of probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) should be increased in all 
regulation-making processes, in order to supplement the deterministic approaches, and 
reinforce the traditional defense-in-depth philosophy (U.S.NRC, 1995). In fact, even 
though this approach was originally used only for few specific regulations, its 
application has been generalized, especially after the nuclear catastrophe of three-mile 
Island (U.S.NRC, 2009).  
 
Although encouraging, and being at the origin, of the use of risk analysis 
techniques, NRC has also insisted on their limits, especially with regard to the 
uncertainties. They suggest that the guiding principle is “risk informed” and not “risk 
based” rule making. Accordingly, the risk-informed and performance-based regulatory 
structure should rather be used as holistic principles, to complement the NRC’s 
deterministic approach and support the NRC’s traditional defense-in-depth philosophy 
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(Lassagne, 2004), which confirms the importance of keeping the balance right between 
the utilization of different techniques. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Framework for Risk-informing of a specific regulation 
 
US Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (2000, April). Framework for risk-informing the 
technical requirements of 10 CFR 50. Retrieved May 02, 2009, from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2000/secy2000-
0086/attachment1.pdf
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recently, the new principles of “realism” and “conservatism” were introduced 
by the NRC. These principles consist of:   
• The regulations are informed by “the real world”, science, technology, the 
experience (Realistic approach); 
• Safety margins are preserved in an effective and adequate manner 
(conservatism principle); 
• A balanced approach must allow the protection of the public health and the 
safety, in ensuring that the resources are allocated the prioritized safety subjects; 
• The regulation must correspond to the real risk and not to assumptions of 
“worst case” scenarios (Diaz, 2003), to avoid over-regulation and wastage of 
resources. 
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III.3. Offshore industry: the “safety case” approach 
 
The UK offshore regulation approach has been marked by a significant shift in 
the last decades. In fact, following to Lord Cullen’s investigation into the “Piper 
Alpha” disaster in 1988, it has been proved that the compliance with prescriptive safety 
codes and standards was not sufficient to ensuring the safety of offshore systems 
(Cullen, 1990). Consequently, the regulatory trend moved away from prescriptive 
requirements towards performance-based systems, where the responsibility shifted to 
the oil/gas exploration operators, who should develop and present well reasoned 
arguments and evidence proving that the design and operation of their systems achieve 
acceptable levels of safety, in all their life cycle stages. This approach is referred to as 
the “safety case” (HSE, 2006). 
 
Kuo (1999) states that the concept of the “safety case” has been developed and 
derived from the application of “systems engineering principles”, whereby the safety 
of systems and installations does not depend solely on previous operational experience, 
but rather uses all available expertise and information in a logical way. Accordingly, 
the principles of this approach were first adopted by the nuclear industry, and later by 
the chemical and offshore sectors. 
 
For instance, if a new installation concept is generated, the safety of the project 
can be modeled by answering a number of fundamental questions such as the 
following: 
Table 3: Fundamentals of the safety case concept 
Questions Tasks Scientific terms 
What aspects can go 
wrong? Identifying hazards systematically Hazard Identification 
What are the likelihoods 
and impacts? 
Assessing the risk levels of the 
hazards Risk Assessment 
How can they be reduced? Reducing risk levels of selected hazards Risk Reduction 
What to do if an accident 
occurs? 
Being prepared to respond to 
emergency situations 
Emergency 
preparedness 
How can safety be 
managed 
Managing and controlling risk levels 
of hazards 
Safety Management 
System 
Kuo, C. (1999). Managing ship safety. London: LLP publishing 
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Accordingly, the use of risk management principles were generalized and 
progressively increased throughout the offshore industry. Pillay and Wang (2003) 
identified five key elements on which the “safety case” concept is based, as follows: 
 
• Hazard Identification 
Identifying all likely hazards, which would potentially endanger the system or 
cause a major accident.  
• Risk assessment 
Evaluating the risk levels associated with each identified hazard, hazards are 
generally grouped in three regions, namely intolerable, tolerable (As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable ALARP region) and negligible as shown in Figure 4. 
 
  
  
 
 
Figure 04: HSE framework for risk tolerability  
Det Norske Veritas. (2002). Marine risk assessment. London: HSE Books. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Risk reduction 
Reducing risks associated with intolerable levels and, lowering tolerable risk if 
such operation can be done cost-effectively. 
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• Emergency preparedness 
To be prepared in the event that a hazard becomes a reality, even when all 
necessary precautions have been taken against it, and take the appropriate measures to 
reduce its impacts. 
• Safety management system 
The purpose of the SMS is ensuring that the organization is safely and 
efficiently achieving its goals, without damage to the people, the installations and the 
environment. The SMS has five components as follows:  
 
- Formulation of the Policy; 
- Organizing the resources  and communication of information; 
- Implementation of the agreed policies and actions; 
- Measuring the achievement of the required standards; 
- Review of performance and making relevant refinement. 
  
These five key elements on which the “safety case” concept is based, are 
presented in Figure 5 (Kuo & Cojeen, 2000): 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The Five key elements of the safety case concept 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The nuclear and offshore safety concepts are considered to be pillows of the 
modern safety approach, and have certainly influenced the new proactive maritime 
approach adopted by the IMO, which will now be reviewed. 
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III.4. From prescription to performance: 
 
Being proactive means identifying at early stages the factors that may affect 
the maritime safety and developing rules and regulations that would prevent the 
occurrence of such undesirable events, as opposed to the “regulation by disaster” that 
responds, on a ad-hoc basis, to a single accident (Psaraftis, 2002). 
 
The paradigm shift toward a proactive maritime safety includes the transition 
from prescriptive to performance-based codes. In fact, this tendency of moving 
toward performance-based codes is, in part, due to the fast pace of technological 
innovation and the negative aspect of prescriptive regulations to respond to these 
scientific and engineering advances.  
 
In contrast, performances–based codes basically set the safety objectives and 
criteria, and leave to the designer the conception and selection of the most effective 
alternatives of achieving these objectives, which allow a great degree of flexibility 
and encourages innovation (Hadjisophocleous & Bénichou, 2000). 
 
Historically, the conservative prescriptive approach was synonymous of 
providing a large margin of safety to reduce the likelihood of accidents, and/or give 
the means to mitigate their consequences if they occur (Meserve, 2000). Moreover, 
when an accident happens, more prescriptions were generated to respond to the new 
causes and effects of the new event. This approach included many assumptions and 
oversimplification, especially because of the lack of extensive knowledge and sharp 
scientific and technological tools that are available nowadays. 
 
The main difference between a performance-based approach and a more 
traditional prescriptive approach is finally the change from the angle of view of the 
studied system: the traditional approaches are more specific and analytical, while 
performance standards are more holistic and risk based.  
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However, this paradigm shift implies also some practical consequences. For 
instance, the prescriptive rules are easier to follow for the designers and 
manufacturers, easier to control for third parties, namely classification societies and 
maritime authorities, and relatively easy to implement for the legislators. 
Nevertheless, the fundamental difficulties related to the use of the prescriptive 
approaches, as well as the advances in scientific safety analysis, mainly in the risk 
management field, increased the interest for the performance-based approaches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Paradigm shift, from prescriptive to performance-based regulations 
 
Thus, the main characteristics associated with prescriptive regulations are: 
limited flexibility for architecture and reduced design optimization; difficulty of 
application to new concepts; taking into account of the technical systems, unbalanced 
and contradictory requirements of safety; little transparency; reactivity and continuous 
amendments. 
 
 On the other hand, the characteristics associated with performance-based 
codes are: flexibility; introduction of new concepts; explicit objectives of safety; pro-
activity and taking into account of nontechnical aspects such as human element. 
These characteristics validate the preference for the performance-based approaches, 
and justify the critical vision of the prescriptive approaches to maritime safety. 
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Practically, the choice of a prescriptive or performance-based approach will 
have the following impacts: 
 
? Ships in construction: design and conformity  
 
From the ship-builders perspective, prescriptive rules are easy to implement, 
despite their complexities. They are incrusted in the shipyards building culture, and 
therefore allow reduced conception and design delays, resulting in increasingly 
shorter times of construction. The implementation of new performance-based rules 
requires the development of new knowledge, new tools and a new culture. The 
question arises concerning the times of design and construction. Thus, these new 
changes will be reflected on the ship-building delays. Consequently, the ship-owners 
needs will undoubtedly influence the degree of innovation of the yard, which will 
create a new factor of competition within the ship-building industry. 
 
The situation will be identical from the under-construction classification and 
certification point of view. The new performance-based approach would generate new 
knowledge and expertise needs, which will be reflected on the delays of classification 
and certification. 
 
? Ships in service: operation and control 
 
With regard to the ships’ crew, relatively standardized ships and working 
environments conform to traditional prescription create, from a first point of view, an 
element of safety. New concepts would certainly impose new specific familiarization, 
training, and competencies. 
 
Finally, regarding the last shackle of the safety chain, the inspections and 
surveys of ships that do not conform to standardized prescriptive requirements can be 
problematic, either for statutory and classification surveys, or Port State inspections. 
Thus, new training needs and new surveys and inspections regimes would be required. 
 
A comparative review contrasting the advantages and disadvantages of theses 
two approaches is summarized in Table 4 (Chantelauve, 2006; Hadjisophocleous & 
Bénichou, 2000; Kuo, 1999 ; Tavares, 2008):  
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Table 4: Prescriptive vs. Performance-based regulations 
Regulation 
approaches Merits Drawbacks 
Prescriptive • Straightforward concept, direct 
analysis and interpretation, 
noncomplex application and 
evaluation. 
• Setting reference standards to 
be met by anyone who wants to 
build and operate a ship or marine 
vehicle. 
• No requirements for specific 
qualification or high levels of 
engineering and expertise. 
• Specification of the requirements 
without clear statement of 
objectives. 
• Inhibits innovative alternatives 
and inflexibility for innovation. 
• Difficulties of keeping up-to-date 
and tends to lag behind 
technological advances. 
• Little promotion of cost-
effectiveness analysis. 
• Complex structure and need for 
continuous amendments. 
• Assume that there is only one 
way to provide the required safety 
level, and are not much open to 
alternative solutions. 
• Once the standard requirement 
has been satisfied, there are little 
incentives for operators to achieve 
safety levels beyond. 
• Possibility of imbalance because 
of the influence of major disasters. 
Performance-
based • Establishment of clearly defined safety objective and 
leaving to the engineers the 
freedom of defining the criteria 
and methodology to achieving 
them. 
• Flexibility for introducing 
innovative design solutions that 
meet the performance criteria. 
• Harmonization of international 
standards. 
• Reduced complexity of 
documents. 
• Facilitating the introduction of 
innovative technologies and 
knowledge 
• Usage of cost-effectiveness 
analysis, and allowing great 
flexibility for the designer 
• Difficulty to clearly quantifying 
the safety levels. 
• Need for further education and 
training especially because of 
reduced comprehension especially 
during the first phases of 
implementation. 
• Difficulties to analyze and 
evaluate the compliance of 
“equivalent projects” with the 
established standards. 
• Difficulties for the validation of 
the methodologies and tools used for 
defining the quantitative criteria. 
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III.5. Factors influencing the choice of the regulation approach: 
 
Both prescriptive and performance-based regulations have their merits and 
drawbacks; thus the real strength lies in recognizing the factors that would favor one 
concept or the other, and how to use both approaches in harmony. Now, an analysis of 
the context in which a transition in the safety regulation regime can occur will be 
made, and more precisely, the aspects influencing the choice of a prescriptive or 
performance-based safety approach.  
 
? The HSE “permissioning” regime 
 
The U.K. Health & Safety Commission (HSC/E) suggests that a new safety 
regime would be proposed, only where the “normal forms of regulation are not 
sufficient and where the extra demands imposed by the regime are justified by the 
benefits it brings” (U.K. HSE, 2003). It proposes that a combination of at least one 
criterion in A and the criterion in B will help determining the need to generate a new 
safety regime, called “permissioning” regime, which can be assimilated to the 
performance-based approach. 
 
Table 5: HSE criteria for determining the need for a “permissioning” regime  
Criteria Description 
A • There is a need to have regard to high, sustained and broadly based 
levels of societal concern, either existing or likely, over potential risks of 
harm (eg high levels of public dread or aversion associated with the 
hazard and the vulnerability of those exposed to the hazard); and/or 
• There are significant risks of multiple fatalities from a single (or linked 
series of) event(s); and/or 
• There are significant risks of widespread and significant adverse 
effects on human health. 
B • The proposed regime adds proportionate value in terms of risk control 
and/or allows specific activities (with clear benefits to society) to proceed. 
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? The UKOOA decision-making framework 
 
In the document submitted by Japan to the 81st MSC session, related to the 
safety level approach for Goal-Based new ship construction Standards (GBS), it is 
proposed that the United Kingdom’s Offshore Operators Association  framework for 
risk-based decision making (UKOOA,1999), can be used to assist in risk-related 
decision-making. The main purpose of this tool is evaluating different alternatives 
during the feasibility studies and concept stages of a given project, in relation to 
certain hazards such as fire, explosion, loss of stability and others (IMO, 2006a). 
 
The framework’s model takes the form of a decisions’ spectrum, ranging from 
decisions influenced by engineering parameters to decisions where the societal values 
are important. At the right-hand side of the model are positioned characteristics which 
indicate the decisional context; to the left, are indicated the means of calibration.  
 
This approach establishes that the evaluation of the risks that can have a 
significant impact for the decisions of the type B, implying uncertainties and 
deviations from the usual best practice and standards. While for the decisions of the 
type A and C, the evaluation of risk is still suitable, but has less influence on the final 
decision. Accordingly, it can be noted that most IMO regulations fall within the “type 
B” decisions category of the spectrum. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Maritime Organization. (2006a, February 5). Goal-Based new ship 
construction Standards- Safety levels – Submitted by Japan. (MSC 81/6/3). 
London: Author 
 
Figure 7: UKOOA decision-making Framework 
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The framework is not intended to be a prescriptive method, and can be used 
for a wide range of application (Yang & Al., 2001). However, its usage can be 
complex and its interpretation can become subjective. 
 
? ISM Code: a paradigm shift 
 
The implementation of the ISM Code is recognized to be the first and most 
significant paradigm shift, which was adopted by the IMO, to move toward a 
proactive maritime safety. If applying the previously analyzed theories related to the 
need for a transition in the regulation approach, it can be noted that, by the end of the 
20th century, serious accidents continued to happen within the maritime industry, 
despite the application of the relevant international rules and standards on board the 
involved ships (Kletz, 2001), which raised great social anxieties regarding the safety 
levels in the maritime field.  
 
With regard to the HSE criteria for determining the need for a “permissioning” 
regime, these conditions perfectly respond to the need for a transition toward a new 
safety regime. Indeed, the conditions stated in the A and B rows of Table 5 are 
combined in this case, which justifies the need to change the safety regime. 
Accordingly, more responsibility was moved to the ship operator, who became 
required to provide a Safety Management System that meets the safety objectives 
fixed by the Code, establishes safeguards against all identified risks, and provides 
evidence to prove the system’s safety is effectively managed. This transition 
represented a noteworthy move toward the shipping industry self-regulation. 
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Chapter IV: Risk management and proactive safety 
 
IV.1. Introduction 
Basically, risk is incrusted in all safety aspects. If refering to the definition of 
the term “safety”, which can be for instance “the term that is normally used to 
describe the degree of freedom from danger” (Kristiansen, 2005), risk is the concept 
that allows evaluating the levels of protection from hazards and thus the degree of 
freedom from danger. 
 
Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) state that the evolution toward a proactive 
“no-accident-is-tolerable” policy, which improves the safety levels of any industry, 
can not be attained without applying adequate and effective risk management 
strategies. Recently, The IMO finalized the consolidated text of the Guidelines for 
Formal Safety Assessment, and thus, endeavors to generalize, where possible, the use 
of risk management theories in its rule making process (IMO, 2007a).  
 
In this chapter, the role of risk theories in developing proactive maritime 
safety regime will be analyzed, and the difficulties faced by the risk-based approach 
will be investigated. But first, the category to which the maritime safety regulation 
belongs will be defined, and in the level in which it is positioned compared to other 
industries’ safety systems will be identified. 
 
IV.2. Categorization of safety control systems 
 
Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) associate the risk management strategies with 
the related categories of accidents. Accordingly, three safety control categories can be 
defined as follows: 
 
• Empirical safety control: focusing on safety systems where accident are 
frequent but with relatively small consequences. This category deals with 
occupational safety, where the hazards are controlled empirically by epidemiological 
analysis of past accidents. The level of safety is measured by the “LTI” index (Lost-
Time-Injuries), mainly used in the manufacturing and other relatively non-hazardous 
industries. 
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• Evolutionary safety control: protecting against relatively unlikely accidents 
that have medium impacts. The safety of this category of systems starts from the 
improvement of the design reacting to the analysis of the “individual, latest major 
accident”. The safety control is created by building up several lines of defense 
against accidents. This approach is mainly focused on the removal of the causes of a 
particular accident. Examples of application of this safety control approach could be 
the aircraft and railways safety. 
 
• Analytical safety control: dealing with systems where accidents are rare, but 
have heavy impacts. For this approach accidents will be so rare that the modeling can 
not be based on empirical evidence from accident analysis. The risk is predicted and 
modeled using probabilistic approaches (Probabilistic Risk Analysis “PRA”), based 
on the estimation of likelihood of a simultaneous violation of all the designed safety 
barriers. This safety concept mainly concerns very sensitive industries such as 
nuclear or chemical sectors, where the pace of innovation is very fast and a “no-
accident-is-tolerable” policy is applied (Rasmussen & Svedung 2000). 
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Figure 8: Rasmussen’s Categorisation of safety control systems 
 
Rasmussen, J. & Svedung, I. (2000). Proactive Risk Management in a Dynamic Society. 
Borås: Sjuhäradsbygdens 
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• Safety control in the maritime sector:  
 
Maritime safety can be regarded as a hybrid regime that combines both 
empirical and evolutionary safety control approaches. Not only maritime regulation 
deals with the occupational safety of people on board (personnel protection, and 
working place safety), but also it sets the barriers that would prevent major accidents. 
Also, the maritime safety regulation focuses both on removing the causes of accidents, 
and the mitigation of their consequences in the unfortunate event they occur. 
 
Accordingly, in its efforts to move toward a proactive safety, it is necessary 
for IMO to set up methodologies that will allow identifying, assessing and managing 
all risks associated with maritime activities. These risk-oriented methodologies would 
constitute the framework upon which the holistic safety regime could be developed. 
 
IV.3. Possible configurations of safety regimes 
 
Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin (2001) define a safety regime as being the rules, 
practices and ideas associated with the regulation and control of a risk or a particular 
hazard. The configuration of safety regimes depends upon the approaches adopted for 
the rule-making (deterministic or probabilistic), and the nature of the application 
process (prescriptive or performance-based). The probabilistic approach is intended to 
combine the evaluation of the frequency of an event with its level of consequence; it 
can therefore be considered as a risk-based approach (Lassagne, 2004).  
 
 
Table 6: classification of safety regimes 
Rules making 
Rules application 
Deterministic Probabilistic 
Prescriptive Traditional Risk based 
Performance-based Risk Based Purely risk based 
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Accordingly, depending on the process adopted for the rule making and the 
application methodologies, safety regulation can be classified in four categories as 
follows: 
 
• Traditional approach: where the regulator prescribes technical requirements 
based on previous experience or deterministic calculation. This approach corresponds 
to the traditional maritime safety.  
 
• Purely risk-based approach: where rule making process is based upon 
probabilistic calculation, associated with performance-based application codes, 
mostly used in the nuclear sector where no accident can be tolerated. 
 
• Risk-based approach: in which either the performance-based rules are 
generated from deterministic approach, or, prescriptive rules are based upon 
probabilistic calculations e.g.: the regulator can impose specific technical solutions 
drawn up from lessons generated by risk analysis techniques, which represent the 
approach adopted for the proactive maritime safety. 
 
These four principal categories can be supplemented by rules of equivalence, 
e.g.: a prescriptive rule can be satisfied by equivalent solutions other than the 
prescriptive requirements, as for SOLAS Chapter I/regulation 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35
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IV.4. Safety and Risk management 
 
The progressive evolution of a maritime safety regime toward a proactive 
approach has various aspects. First of all by the introduction of risk analysis tools 
in the development of prescriptive regulations, then by creating some openings within 
the SOLAS Convention by offering the possibility to adopt innovative solutions that 
provide equivalent levels of safety, also, within the framework of the rules 
development for the High Speed Craft (HSC) for which existing prescriptive safety 
requirement can not be enforced; finally, by enforcing requirements concerning the 
safety and security management systems.  
 
Focusing on all these safety concepts allows noticing that risk management is 
a central point governing them. For instance, risk analysis will allow deciding whether 
the alternative solutions to SOLAS requirements, or the HSC innovative technologies, 
provide equivalent safety levels. Also, risk management tools are the backbone for 
setting and verifying the safety margins of performance-based regulations. 
 
Many authors were interested in the description of the techniques of risk 
management and analysis in various sectors, such as financing, economy, banking, 
contingency planning and other fields. The new tendency of a proactive maritime 
safety regime is one of the fields of application of risk sciences, or more modestly, of 
the techniques of risk control and management. In order to centre the remarks, the 
following definitions are proposed:  
  
•  Risk analysis: a process which objective is the estimation of the risk;  
•  Risk assessment: confrontation of the risk levels with the criteria of risk 
acceptability, with the objective of formalization of the Risk Control Options;  
• Risk management: the whole process including the selection of the suitable 
Risk Control Options and their implementation in the management of the safety 
of the considered activity.  
 
The principle of risk management theory can be summarized in the Figure 10: 
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Figure 10: Risk Management System 
 
International Maritime Organization. (2006b, September 14). Manual on Oil Spill Risk 
Evaluation and Assessment of Response Preparedness - Submitted by New Zealand. 
(MEPC/OPRC-HNS/TG 5/3). London: Author 
 
Hazard identification and risk assessment are arguably the most important 
phases of a system safety lifecycle and often the most difficult. They are also a major 
source of uncertainty as they greatly dependent on experts’ judgment (Moore, 2005). 
These concepts can be classified as follows: 
 
• Hazard Identification 
 
The identification of the hazards is mainly based on the opinion of experts, 
with various backgrounds, who associate each function of the considered system with 
the risks that result from it, the accidents to which they are exposed, the conditions 
likely to lead to these potential accidents, and the consequences of these accidents in 
the possibility where they occur. Diverse hazard identification techniques are essential 
to ensure that all hazards are identified. These techniques include qualitative tools 
such as Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), HAZard and OPerability (HAZOP) or 
Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Assessment (FMECA), (Securius & Al., 1999). 
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• Risk assessment: 
 
Chantelauve (2006) distinguishes the deterministic risk analysis approaches, 
which are interested in the consequences of an undesirable event, and the probabilistic 
approaches which, either, evaluate the probability of an undesirable event, or evaluate 
simultaneously its probabilities and consequences. It is also possible to make a 
distinction between the approaches which are based on the evaluation of a failure, of a 
cause or an impact, and approaches that make a combined evaluation of the 
undesirable events.  
 
Other approaches distinguish the qualitative from quantitative analysis. The 
qualitative analyses mainly review the modes of failure of a system based on experts’ 
judgments, and try to describe the magnitude of potential consequences and likelihood 
that those consequences will occur. The quantitative approaches aim to characterize 
the level of risk by extrapolating numerical values of likelihood and consequences, 
mainly from accidental data, and/or using various other techniques for modeling the 
possible outcomes of a set of events. Halfway between the qualitative and quantitative 
approaches, the semi-quantitative approach is mainly based on the judgment of 
experts and the characterization of the level of risks using ranking scales such as risks 
matrix. These approaches can be used jointly or separately (Shuohui, Xuejing, Shuang 
& Xuan, 2006).  
 
Finally, it can be concluded that a risk analysis technique may be classified in 
various categories, and that the methods used generally represent a combination of 
various techniques. 
 
IV.5. Example of risk-based regulation: probabilistic damage stability 
 
Ships’ stability and subdivision are covered by Chapter II-1 “Construction - 
Structure, subdivision and stability, machinery and electrical installations” of the 
SOLAS Convention. The subdivision of the ships into watertight compartments must 
ensure that, after a hypothetical damage of the hull, the ship remains afloat in a stable 
position. Two approaches exist for these problems: the “deterministic” approach and 
the “probabilistic” approach. 
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The object of the deterministic method is to ensure that ships can survive 
without capsizing after the flooding of a fixed number of damaged compartments. 
Recently, a more risk-based “probabilistic” concept which uses the probability of 
survival after collision as a measure of ships’ safety in a damaged condition was 
adopted, and entered into force on January, 01st 2009 (IMO, 2008).  
 
The development of this approach is based on the study of statistical data from 
the collision accidents analysis, which allowed establishing the probability of 
damages at different positions of the ship. This study generated a diagram of the 
damages, which can be used to make the design of the ships safer and more effective. 
For instance, the study reveals that the forward part of the ship is subject to the most 
important damages, and therefore its reinforcement will greatly improve the attained 
subdivision index more than the reinforcement of other ship locations, which 
corresponds to the Risk Assessment and Risk Control principles.  
 
Accordingly, the new philosophy introduced by this concept is that two 
different ships which have the same subdivision index “A” have equal safety levels 
and, therefore, there is no need for special treatment of specific parts of the ship, even 
if they are able to survive different random damages. 
 
This approach enables evaluating the probability of ship’s survival: the 
evidence of compliance with the rule is attained simply if the probability of calculated 
survival is acceptable. This “probabilistic” concept, based on statistical facts of 
collisions circumstances, allows obtaining a much more realistic image of the endured 
risk for survivability after damage, as compared with the old “deterministic” methods 
whose subdivision design principles are more theoretical than practical. 
 
However, it should be noted that, still, some deterministic “minor damage” 
principles are still used, especially for the development of passenger ships subdivision 
rules, in order to avoid such ships being designed with what can be perceived as 
“unacceptably vulnerable spots” in some parts of their length (IMO, 2008). 
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IV.6. Difficulties associated with risk-based regulations: 
 
The evolution toward proactive risk-based regulations includes a number of 
difficulties that have to be overcome in order to control risks effectively. These 
difficulties comprise the following: 
 
• Control Referential  
 
The conformity with performance-based regulations can be more difficult to 
prove as compared to the more traditional prescriptive regulations. Moreover, setting 
a performance referential can be problematic, as the risk control options that will 
allow setting the adequate safety levels depend on a multitude of parameters. 
 
This problem actually covers another dilemma related to the fact that the 
maritime authorities must have the adequate resources and expertise that allow, not 
only delivering valuable judgments concerning the effectiveness of the risk control 
measures and their proper implementation, but also the ability to carry analysis of the 
adequacy of the used safety alternatives and innovative techniques to prove whether 
they provide the required safety levels. 
 
• Increased costs for standard setting and application 
 
Lassagne (2004) suggests that the costs associated with risk-based regulations, 
paradoxically, proved to be higher than those related to the traditional simple 
regulations, because of the important expertise and technicality required; however, the 
author’s opinion is that they could never exceed the costs associated with over-
regulation and prescriptive rules, once the necessary knowledge would be acquired.  
 
This new knowledge is required at the same time from the legislator’s side, 
and also from the shipbuilders and ships operators parts, since they became 
respectively requested to provide technical solutions and safety management systems 
that meet the required performance and objectives. 
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• ALARP concept and Public Perception  
 
Risk acceptance criteria are continuously subject to diverse polemics, in spite 
of many theoretical contributions attempting to solve this dilemma, such as the 
Formal Safety Assessment in the maritime field. 
 
It is argued that setting the Tolerable, Intolerable and ALARP regions is 
greatly influenced by the public perception of risk. In fact, human understanding and 
cultures are considered to be the backbone of the risk concepts, thus the acceptance 
criteria will be influenced by many social factors, such as ethnic and social aspects, 
and even the degree of trust accorded to the experts and legislators in charge of setting 
the adequate protective and preventive solutions for controlling risks (Pidgeon et al., 
2003).  
Practically, Beck (2004) states that what individuals perceive as risky will 
depend on their values and their preferences. Thus, the ALARP border is dynamic and 
moves with the wellness of each country. Figure 11 illustrates, for instance, the “Cost 
of Averting a Fatality” for OECD countries. This graphic would certainly show much 
bigger fluctuations if developing, or other non-OECD, Countries were included. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Cost of Averting a Fatality – OECD Countries (2002) 
Kontovas C. A. (2005). Formal Safety Assessment: Critical Review and Future Role. 
Unpublished Diploma thesis. National Technical University of Athens, School of 
Naval Architecture & Marine Engineering, Greece 
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• Dealing with uncertainties 
 
Aven and Vinnem (2007) define risk as being the combination of the two 
basic dimensions: possible consequences and associated uncertainties. Accordingly, it 
can be argued that if uncertainties are suppressed, there would be no risk and safety 
would be almost guaranteed. Nevertheless, full safety is practically unattainable, 
especially for the complex systems such as the maritime sector mainly because of 
human involvement. 
 
Uncertainties are introduced at many levels of the development of a risk based 
project, for instance hazard identification and qualitative analysis are based on 
experts’ judgments, and it is obvious that nothing is more uncertain than human 
opinion. Moreover, even the assignment of probability values and estimations of 
consequences are based on a number of assumptions and suppositions that depend on 
the quality and judgment of experts who often tend to make oversimplifications. 
 
Hence, uncertainty needs to be carefully considered during the whole system 
safety lifecycle, and should be reflected in the decision-making process. Nevertheless, 
they should be progressively reduced, during the concretization of the projects, both 
during the risk-based rules modeling and the system engineering process. The finality 
is to bring the uncertainties within ALARP limits that provide acceptable confidence 
and reliability (Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 12: Evolution of the uncertainties  
during Risk Management and Engineering processes 
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IV.7. Accidental elements 
 
Shipping is continuously subject to the risk of occurrence of accidents and 
incidents with significant consequences on human lives and the maritime environment. 
Accordingly, it is indispensable to carry out casualty investigation, in order to collect 
and analyse the data concerning the contributing and causation factors of the accidents, 
and to produce the necessary input for the foresight of threats to maritime safety. 
 
However, casualty statistics related to ships total loss, for instance, differ from 
one data base to another (depending IMO, OECD, Lloyd Register and others), which 
distort the general image of the attained safety levels. Also, it is noted that the 
statistics concerning the sea events can reveal important variations, from one year to 
the other, as described in Figure 13 (IMO, 2005a). However, when longer periods are 
considered, it becomes possible to identify general tendencies, which follow a 
relatively decreasing trend. 
 
Nevertheless, the new proactive concept for maritime rule-making process 
requires the development of unified taxonomies, and accident causation models, in 
addition to the common international casualty data bases, such as the “GISIS” 
developed by the IMO or the “EMCIP” developed by the European Maritime safety 
Agency (EMSA). These new approaches will allow making in depth analysis, to 
foresee realistic accident probabilities and impact values, which will allow reducing 
risk uncertainties. 
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Figure 13: Total loss of ships over 100 GT and lives lost at sea 1989-2004  
International Maritime Organization. (2005, February 23). Casualty Statistics and 
Invistigations – Very serious casualties for the year 2003. (FSI.3/Circ.6). London: Author. 
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IV.8. Chapter conclusions 
 
This Chapter was interested in the categorization of the maritime safety 
regime and the contribution of risk sciences to the safety regulation.  
 
The change from a prescriptive and deterministic approach toward an 
performance-based and probabilistic approach is underlined as being a shift toward 
proactive risk-based regulations, which represent a change from microscopic and 
specific approach to a more macroscopic and holistic concept.  
The difficulties that would be faced by the new proactive regime were also 
discussed, as well as the contextual conditions that would allow apprehending the 
potential development of one approach or the other. 
 
  Finally, it can be argued that the regulation revolution is not perceptible in 
the current context; progressive evolution supported by effective training is more 
desirable. Thus, both traditional and risk-based approaches should continue to exist 
side by side and complete each other. For instance, risk management tools can be 
introduced in the process of elaboration of prescriptive requirements, similar to the 
“risk informed” concept related to the nuclear industry; on the other hand, prescriptive 
arrangement can be utilized to set the safety objectives and evaluate the conformity to 
the performance-based regulations. 
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Chapter V: FSA: a risk-based rule making process 
 
V.1. General context 
 
The British initiatives following the capsizing of the “Herald of Free 
Enterprise” in 1987, led to approval, in 1997, of The Interim Guidelines for the 
Application of Formal Safety Assessment to the IMO Rule-Making Process “FSA” 
(MSC/Circ.829-MEPC/Circ.335), to be used within the IMO framework of rules 
development (IMO, 1997). Subsequently, after experimental applications such as the 
bulk carriers safety, the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC.74 in 2001), and the 
Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC.47 in 2002), approved the IMO 
“Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO rule-making 
process” (MSC/Circ.1033-MEPC/Circ.392) (IMO, 2002), which were amended in 
consecutively in 2005 and 2006 (IMO, 2005b; IMO, 2006c).  
 
The objectives of the Formal Safety Assessment process are the improvement 
of the maritime safety framework, including the protection of human life and the 
preservation of the marine environment and goods, while being based on the risk 
assessment and cost-benefit analysis principles. The FSA is a tool that can help 
evaluating new rules related to the safety of ships and the protection of the marine 
environment, or to carry out a comparative evaluation between existing rules and their 
possible amendments and improvement, in order to get the “balance right” between 
various technical and operational factors, including the human element, and the ships’ 
safety, the protection of the marine environment and the costs effectiveness. 
 
 
Figure 14: FSA: Getting “the balance right” 
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V.2. The FSA methodology 
 
The FSA process consists of a structured rational and systematic methodology 
aiming to: 
• Assess the risks related to maritime safety and the preservation of the 
marine environment; and to 
• Evaluate the costs and benefits of IMO’s alternatives for the reduction 
of these risks. 
It comprises five steps, as illustrated in Figure 15, in addition to a preparatory stage of 
problem definition (IMO, 2007a). These five steps are as follows: 
 
• Step 1: Hazard Identification (HAZID);  
• Step 2: Risks Analysis;  
• Step 3: Risks Control Options (RCO);  
• Step 4: Cost/Benefit assessement (CBA); and 
• Step 5: Recommendations for the decision-making. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Illustrative flowchart of the FSA framework (IACS-MSC 75, 2002) 
International Maritime Organization. (2006d, August 29). Formal Safety assessment- 
Possible improvements on FSA Guidelines Submitted by Greece. (MSC 82/INF.3). London: 
Author 
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V.2.1. The preparatory stage 
 
The FSA process must be preceded by preliminary work to define the problem 
that will be assessed. It includes the definition of the type of ship to be studied, the 
specification of relevant constraints, and the delimitation of depth and extent of the 
study itself. This work will also allow gathering all available information and data 
related to accidents, incidents and reliability elements for the considered subject. The 
accuracy of this stage is fundamental for the rest of the FSA studies, as it will 
influence the whole rest of the project. In fact, a deficient appreciation in this stage 
can lead to erroneous assessments of major risks during the FSA process. 
 
However, the consistency of the collected data, its detail and the effectiveness 
of the methodologies used throughout the process is often not guaranteed, which 
handicaps the progress of the FSA study. For instance, the FSA study on bulk carriers 
took about 30 months to be achieved (December 1999- May 2002) (IMO, 2006d). 
 
In this context, in order to refine the problem and to help selecting the 
adequate theories and methodologies to be applied, a generic model is defined at this 
stage (IMO, 1998). It will not be regarded as a particular ship, but rather as a whole of 
systems including operation, organization, management, human factor, and equipment 
as illustrated in Figure 16. 
Navigation/
Communication Bunkering / 
Storage Emergency preparedness 
 Miscellaneous
Manoeuvrability
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mooring/
Towing
Structure
Anchoring
Pollution 
prevention
Accommodation 
Power /
Propulsion
Payload/
Stability
 
Generic Ship / 
Maritime transport
 
Figure 16: Principle functions related to the generic ship  
Boisson, P. (1996). FSA : a new approach to safety at sea. Bulletin Technique du 
Bureau Veritas, 3, 7-20. 
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V.2.2. Step 1: Hazard Identification 
 
The object of this first step of the FSA study is to identify all potential 
hazardous situations related to the considered problem and to prioritize them 
according to their risk levels. It combines creative and analytical tools (IMO, 2006d). 
This combination ensures the proactivity of the whole process and allows avoiding 
the confinement to hazards that happened in the past.  
 
This step includes two phases: a phase of identification and a phase of ranking.  
  
• Identification  
  
A Maritime Hazard can generically be defined as:  
 
Any scenario or situation that, if not contained, would present an 
intolerable threat to maritime safety.  
 
The Hazard Identification process is generally based on the opinion of a group 
of experts, from various fields, who associate each function of the considered system 
with the risks which result from it, and the accidents to which they are exposed, the 
conditions likely to lead to these potential accidents, and the consequences of these 
accidents in the possibility where they occur (Lassagne, 2004) Several standardized 
techniques can be used, according to the studied problem: such as HAZOP, FMECA or 
What If theories (see Annex A).  
 
Kontovas, Psaraftis & Zachariadis (2007) notice that for most of the 
accomplished FSA studies, hazard identification has mainly, if not exclusively, been 
based on historical data, because it is deemed that where historical data is available, 
there is no need to generate scenarios in order to model the risk profile. However, the 
use of historical data alters the proactive philosophy behind the whole process. Thus, 
this tendency could not be used for innovative designs or probabilistic failures 
modeling, where effective scenarios have to be developed using more elaborate tools. 
 
Finally, it can be argued that, since only the hazards that have been identified 
during this step would be analyzed during the whole FSA process, the accuracy and 
exactness of this stage are vital for the rest of the study. 
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• Ranking 
 
The second goal of this step is developing a ranking list of the identified 
hazards, generally starting from the most severe scenarios, to end by eliminating the 
scenarios that are judged to have negligible significance. The evaluation uses 
qualitative tools at this stage of the analysis. The identified hazards are classified 
using an index of frequency vs. severity, and generally allows generating a qualitative 
risk matrix that represents a visual evaluation of the risk associated with each hazard.  
 
 This step is considered to be a less formal one, mainly based upon the “know 
how” of the experts and their “good sense”. Thus, mathematical and behavioural 
approaches would be necessary to evaluate these opinions. Accordingly, the decision 
making for this step uses tools such as the “concordance coefficient (W)” to evaluate 
the correlation between the experts’ estimations. This coefficient is calculated on the 
basis of a formula that correlates the group of experts’ ranking of a number of hazards, 
and varies between 0 and 1. Hence, it is accepted that the experts attain good 
agreement where this coefficient is W>0.7 (IMO, 2006d). Kontovas (2005), states that, 
mostly, a group of 10 experts allows having a good stability of this coefficient, and 
that the more hazards have to be studied the less number of experts should be used. 
 
Moreover, as proposed by Dourmas, Nikitakos and Lambrou (2007), more 
scientific numerical approaches such as the Bayesian network models or the fuzzy 
logic theory, should be developed further, to analyze and evaluate the experts’ 
decision-making framework. 
 
V.2.3. Step 2: Risk Analysis 
 
The objective of this stage is to make a detailed analysis of the hazards 
identified in the previous step, especially the most severe ones, in order to identify 
and quantify the causes and consequences of the high risk areas. FSA guidelines 
suggest the use “Risk Contribution Tree (RCT)” concept at this stage. This model 
combines Fault Trees and Event Trees, which respectively allow displaying graphical 
representations of the logic combination of causes which lead to an undesirable event, 
and how the consequences of accidents may develop to result in different magnitude 
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of loss. The quantification requires accidental reliability data, and any other suitable 
source of information, particularly, valuable expert judgments.  
Also, it is recommended that risk could be expressed in two categories, 
namely, the “individual risk” and the “societal risk”.  The first category estimates the 
risk for a particular individual at a particular location, in order to ensure that persons 
who may be involved in ships’ accidents are not exposed to excessive risk. The 
second category displays a more comprehensive picture of particular risks from ships 
to societies as a whole, taking into account their geographical distribution. Societal 
Risk is generally expressed in the form of F-N curves which represents the frequency 
(F) in function of a number (N), or more, of fatalities. These F-N diagrams allow 
displaying a more realistic picture of the societal perception of risk, as 1000 accidents 
that kills 1 person are not be perceived as equivalent to 1 accident which kills 1000 
persons for instance (society is less willing to accept the latter case). An example of 
FN diagram is given in Figure 17.  
 
Finally, it can be argued that the units used in the FSA studies submitted to 
IMO are mainly the Potential Loss of Life (PLL), number of fatalities, ship loss, 
environmental harm or frequency of casualties. This can cause some confusion, 
therefore a common quantification unit would be recommended in this stage; this unit 
could be similar to the universal unit used in the CLC or Fund conventions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Example of F-N Curve for different types of ships 
Skjong, R. (2002). Risk acceptance criteria: current proposals and IMO position. Retrieved 
June 25, 2009, from the World Wide Web: 
http://research.dnv.com/skj/Papers/SkjValencia.pdf
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It can, regrettably, be noted from Figure 17 the high likelihood that the total 
number of crew members of bulk carriers (approximately 20 persons) looses their 
lives in the unfortunate event of casualty. 
V.2.4. Step 3: Risk Control Options (RCOs) 
 
According to the FSA guidelines (2007), the purpose of this step is generating: 
“effective and practical RCOs and comprises the following four principal stages: 
.1 focusing on risk areas needing control; 
.2 identifying potential risk control measures (RCMs); 
.3 evaluating the effectiveness of the RCMs in reducing risk by re-evaluating step 2;  
.4 and, grouping RCMs into practical regulatory options.” 
 
Thus, this step consists in identifying possible Risk Control Measures (RCMs), 
and gathering them to establish practical regulatory options (RCOs). The Guidelines 
suggest focusing on the following aspects:  
• Firstly, on prioritizing accidents for which the risk level is unacceptable;  
• Secondly, on the probability for the branches of the RCTs which present 
strong probabilities of occurrence whatever are their consequences.  
• Thirdly, on the gravity, by identifying the fields of the RCTs which 
contribute to very severe consequences; these fields have also to be 
evaluated whatever is their probability;  
• Finally, on the reliability, by identifying the fields for which the RCT 
indicates great uncertainty with regard to the endured risk.  
  
Subsequently, RCOs are analyzed during structured group examination, in 
order to estimate the risk reduction (ΔR) associated with each RCO.  Dourmas, 
Nikitakos and Lambrou (2007) state that estimating ΔR in a numerical mode, 
according to historical data, cannot be proactive in the true sense of the term. Thus, it 
is suggested that the estimation should rather be based on the use of risk matrices and 
qualitative approaches to ensure the proactive aspect of the whole concept. 
 
This step will allow generating: 
.1 a set of RCOs which will be assessed for their risk reduction and cost/benefit 
effectiveness; 
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.2 a list of interested parties involved in the identified RCOs; and 
.3 a list illustrating the interdependencies and possible combinations between the 
identified elementary RCOs. 
V.2.5. Step 4: Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
 
In this stage, the costs associated with the implementation and maintenance of 
each RCO, generated during the previous step, will be evaluated for the whole 
lifetime of the vessel, as well as the benefits gained for the same time period. This 
step marks the end of the qualitative approach used in the previous stages, as 
quantitative tools will now be used to estimate and compare the cost effectiveness of 
each RCO, in terms of cost per ΔR unit. These calculations are the basis for the 
decision-making on the RCOs. 
  
Several indexes are used to express the cost-effectiveness ratio related to the 
human life safeguard. Indeed, IMO prefers to use the term “Cost for averting a 
fatality (CAF)” instead of “cost of a human life” or “cost of a fatality” as human life 
can not be valued. Thus, indexes such as “Gross Cost of Averting a Fatality (GCAF)” 
and “Net Cost of Averting a Fatality (NCAF)” are used. Other indexes, such as the 
“Cost of Averting a Spill Criterion (CATS)”, which are based on the damage and the 
impacts on the environment and installations, are also utilized for the analysis of the 
costs/benefits related to such questions (Kontovas, Psaraftis & Zachariadis, 2007). 
Subsequently, the cost effectiveness of the RCOs is calculated on the basis of such 
indexes. The Gross and Net CAFs are calculated as follows: 
 
 
R
CGCAF Δ
Δ=  
R
BCNCAF Δ
Δ−Δ=  
 
Where:   
 
• ΔC is the cost of the considered RCO per ship.  
• ΔB is the economic benefit per ship gained from the implementation of the 
RCO (may also include the pollution prevention and the prevention of a 
ship’s total loss) (IMO, 2004a).  
 53
 
Chapter V: FSA: a risk-based rule making process 
• ΔR is the reduction of the risk per ship, in terms of a number of fatalities 
averted, rising from the implementation of the RCO.  
Francescutto (2005) proposes an alternative concept, frequently applied by the 
HSE in modern risk assessments, commonly called implied cost of averting a fatality 
(ICAF), and which expresses the risks and costs as a ratio as follows: 
 
 
 ICAF =  
 
This ratio is dimensional, e.g. using monetary units such as £ or $ spent per 
averted fatality. This approach avoids “losing” the valuation of risks to life within the 
calculation, and keeps it explicit. However, the choice of adequate ICAF must still be 
decided, in order to decide which RCO to adopt. 
 
Net cost of the measure 
Reduction in fatality risks 
The advantages and weaknesses of the CBA analysis are summarized in Table 7: 
 
Table 7: Advantages and weaknesses of the CBA Analysis 
Advantages Weaknesses 
Makes the safety vs. cost analysis process 
explicit and traceable  
Difficult to estimate the value of life, the 
process may be considered unethical and 
CBA results may not be widely accepted 
and can provoke hostile reactions. 
Standardization of safety investments Many factors cannot be adequately 
converted into monetary values, and 
should therefore be given equivalent 
weight in the decision-making process. 
Ability to evaluate the costs and benefits 
of a specific measure without knowing 
the risks on the whole installation. 
Costs for averting fatalities are based on 
Life Quality Index (LQI), which is 
dynamic and changes with the wellness 
of the countries, thus, ICAF should 
continuously be reviewed. 
Gives a clear image of the investment for 
the implementation of each individual 
RCO that helps decision-makers. 
Sensitive, some assumptions made during 
this step may greatly change the results of 
the whole FSA process 
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V.2.6. Step 5: Recommendations for Decision-Making: 
 
In this final step of the FSA study, final recommendations are formalized and 
forwarded to decision makers aiming for safety improvement. The recommended 
RCOs should both be “cost effective” and reduce the risk to the “desired safety 
levels”. The review of the FSA studies presented to IMO allows noticing that they at 
least: 
  
• Draw up the list of the principal hazards, risks, costs and benefits identified 
during the evaluation;  
• Explain the basis for the important assumptions, the extent and the principal 
limits of the study, the models and the techniques used for the evaluations 
and the recommendations,  
• Describe the sources, and the main uncertainties associated with the 
evaluation and/or the recommendations,  
• Describe the composition and competences of the group of experts who were 
involved in the FSA study. 
 
V.3. Human factor 
 
The announced IMO’s objectives for the 2000s include emphasizing the 
importance of people for developing a maritime safety culture. Accordingly, shifting 
toward proactive maritime safety implies the need for better understanding the role of 
the human element in accident causation and consequence mitigation, in order to 
enhance the rule-making framework. In fact, it is stipulated in the FSA guidelines that: 
“Human element issues [……] should be systematically treated within the FSA 
framework, associating them directly with the occurrence of accidents, underlying 
causes or influences. Appropriate techniques for incorporating human factors should 
be used” (IMO, 2007a). 
 
Particularly, the IACS gave great importance to the human factor and its 
structured incorporation into the FSA guidelines. Thus, the IACS developed a “Draft 
Guidance on Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) within Formal Safety Assessment 
(FSA)” (IMO, 1999) for its incorporation in the FSA guidelines. This proposal was 
finally integrated into the FSA guidelines (IMO, 2002).  
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The 2007 FSA guidelines’ appendix named “Guidance on Human Reliability 
Analysis (HRA)”, proposes the incorporation of the human factor into the FSA studies, 
by the use of Human Reliability Analysis Techniques, which were developed 
originally by the nuclear sector (Chantelauve, 2006). These techniques provide a 
support at the first three stages of the FSA methodology, as illustrated in Figure 18. 
The HRA process usually includes the following stages: 
 
1. Identification and analysis of the key tasks;  
2. Identification and analysis of the possible human errors; and, 
3. Quantification of human reliability.  
 
The appendix mentions that substantial benefit can be drawn up from the 
qualitative use of HRA techniques during the stage of hazard identification. It also 
recognizes that the data available for a quantification of human reliability are rare, and 
that the experts’ judgments are the more adapted means for the quantification.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Incorporation of HRA into the FSA process 
International Maritime Organization. (2007a, May 14). Formal Safety assessment - 
Consolidated text of the Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in 
the IMO rule-making process (MSC/Circ.1023−MEPC/Circ.392). (MSC 
83/INF.2). London: Author. 
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V.4. Discussion and conclusions 
 
The formal safety assessment process can be considered to be the first rational 
attempt of using the risk analysis approach for the IMO rule making framework. The 
main objective of this concept is to provide a transparent and clearly justified 
decision-making process, which promotes the proactive safety regulation concept in 
opposition to the existing system, which functioned only in reaction to accidents. 
Accordingly, several FSA studies were carried out, associating many partners, 
particularly the European Union and IACS members (for instance the SAFEDOR and 
HARDER projects), for  different types of  ships  such as high speed craft, bulk 
carriers, container ships  and LNG carriers (IMO, 2009). 
 
These studies resulted, for some applications, in new requirements such as the 
amendments to the High Speed Craft Code (HSC Code), to the SOLAS Chapter XI 
related to safety of bulk carriers (especially the Double Side Skin “DSS” 
requirements), and the new regulations concerning the helicopter deck on board 
passenger ships, even though some of these regulations are still creating polemics 
after their adoption.  
However, the whole FSA process is still meeting a number of 
oppositions, associated with the perception that the FSA is likely to lead to 
considerations which are disconnected from the reality, especially because of its 
dependence on experts’ judgments for the Hazard Identification, Risk Reduction 
calculations and cost benefits analysis. In fact these steps depend on qualitative 
approaches, which can suffer from bias, and reduced credibility because of the 
associated uncertainties, and the lack of confidence inside the IMO bodies and 
member states. 
 
Moreover, as opposed to the safety case, which is enforced by the UK on 
British offshore installations, the FSA studies would generate proactive 
recommendations that will be implemented on board international fleets. This aspect 
is problematic in itself, as it will be difficult to convince member states, which have 
various ethnics, diverse cultures and especially different interests, that the proposed 
step-forward regulations would bring the risk within acceptable limits. In fact the 
perception of these acceptable risk limits differs from one society to another. 
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Finally, it can be argued that, in spite of these oppositions, the FSA process is 
still an indispensable tool that can even be used in proactive safety aspects, other than 
the rule-making process, such the individual assessment of safety levels for 
performance-based regulations or to support the “Goal Based Standards” framework. 
In fact, the generalization of the FSA process application for these innovative 
maritime safety approaches, would allow identifying its limitations, which will permit 
reducing the uncertainties, increasing the reliability of the whole process, and 
essentially will promote the generation of effective improvement measures. 
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Chapter VI: Aspects of the proactive rules application 
 
VI.1. Introduction 
 
In the 2000s, new performance-based concepts were introduced by the IMO 
for the application of its instruments. These concepts are mainly established by 
SOLAS regulation II-2/17 related to the Fire Safety Design and Arrangements, and 
the Goal Based Standards for shipbuilding. In this Chapter, a review of the regulatory 
framework of these concepts will be provided, and the “state-of-affairs” concerning 
the application of these approaches will be investigated. 
 
VI.2. Alternative Fire Safety Design and Arrangements 
VI.2.1. General Context  
  
Traditional fire safety regulations, which were mainly created in response to 
specific accidents, hardly became applicable to innovative ship design and building 
technologies. Consequently, in 1998, the Fire Protection Sub-Committee (FP42) 
created a working group in charge of a comprehensive review of SOLAS Chapter II-2, 
which would consider the introduction of more performance-based instruments based 
on risk management theories. In this context, the revised Chapter II-2 of SOLAS 
Convention was adopted in 2000, and entered into force on July 1st, 2002, including a 
new Regulation II-2/17 related to the alternative design and arrangements. 
 
According to this Regulation, the fire safety design and arrangements can 
deviate from the prescriptive requirements set out in the other parts of Chapter II-2, 
provided that all fire protection objectives and the functional fire safety requirements 
are fulfilled.  It is also required that when the fire safety design and arrangements 
deviate from the prescriptive requirements, an engineering analysis, and an evaluation 
and approval of the alternative design and arrangements should be carried out.  
 
Thus, in order to provide uniform guidance for the proper application of these 
rules, the Maritime Safety Committee approved, in its 74th session (2001), the 
Guidelines on Alternative Design and Arrangements for Fire Safety (IMO, 2001a), 
which were amended in 2005 (IMO, 2005c).  
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These guidelines give additional descriptions of the methodology to be 
followed when carrying out engineering analysis and approval of innovative fire 
safety design and arrangements which deviate from the prescriptive rules of SOLAS 
Chapter II-2. 
 
VI.2.2. The new proactive fire safety framework 
 
Since 2002, the new SOLAS Chapter II-2 “Construction - fire protection, 
detection, extinction” enables the designers to conceive arrangements which do not 
fulfill the prescriptive requirements. However these alternative designs should at least 
meet the fire safety objectives of Chapter II-2, which can be summarized as follows: 
 
• Preventing the occurrence of the fire and the explosion;  
• Reducing the risk caused by the fire to human life;  
• Reducing the risk of damage caused by the fire to the ship, its cargo and the 
environment;  
• Confining, controlling and removing the fires and explosions in the 
compartment of origin; and,  
• Providing adequate and easily accessible means of evacuation for the crew 
and the passengers. 
 
Chantelauve (2006) proposes that the fire safety objectives can be illustrated 
in a “Fire Safety Tree” Concept as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 19: SOLAS Chapter II-2 “Fire Safety Tree” 
 61
 
Chapter VI: Aspects of the proactive rules application 
Accordingly, in order to achieve the fire safety objectives, functional 
requirements are incorporated in Chapter II-2 which require:  
 
• The Division of the ship in main vertical and horizontal zones; 
• The Separation between accommodation areas and other spaces; 
• The Restriction in the utilization of combustible materials; 
• The Detection, confinement and extinction of fires in the zone of origin; 
• The Protection of the means of evacuation and access for the fire control;  
• The Availability of the extinguishing equipment; and,  
• The Minimization of the possibility of ignition of flammable cargo vapors 
(Chantelauve, 2006). 
 
Therefore, in order to be in conformity with the SOLAS Chapter II-2, ships 
have to satisfy one of the three following options: 
 
1. Being designed and equipped in conformity with the prescriptive 
requirements of the whole Chapter II-2;  
2. Being fully designed and equipped according to the regulation II-2/17 
“alternative Design and arrangements”, the design and the arrangements of 
the ship, as a whole, should be re-examined and approved according to same 
regulation; or, 
3. Parts of the design and arrangements of the ship were re-examined and 
approved according to Chapter II-2/Part F Regulation 17, and the remaining 
parts are in conformity with the related prescriptive requirements.  
 
VI.2.3. IMO Guidelines for the approval of Alternatives Design 
 
The analysis intended to prove that the proposed alternative design or 
arrangements achieve safety levels which are, at least, equivalent to those ensured by 
the prescriptive regulations and standards of SOLAS Chapter II-2. The concept is 
based on a two stages principle: a qualitative preliminary stage and a quantitative 
stage. These stages are examined hereafter: 
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? Qualitative preliminary stage  
 
The preliminary analysis is intended to define the concept in qualitative terms, 
i.e. to clearly define the area of application of the considered design and arrangement 
and the rules and standards related to them. It also covers the examination of the 
objectives and functional requirements of the regulation, in order to generate fire 
scenarios and any other proactive testing concepts, which should mainly be based on 
the risk management and control science. The testing concept should also take into 
consideration the external elements such as human factors, vessel operations, and 
management (IMO, 2001a) 
 
? Quantitative stage  
 
The quantitative analysis allows making a technical evaluation of the 
alternative arrangements and carrying out adequate tests in quantitative terms, i.e.: 
• Quantifying specific fires of reference and fire scenarios (including elements 
such as heat transfer, smoke, flame heights and generation of toxic gases), 
• Developing performance criteria based on the acceptable prescriptive 
performance criteria; 
• Ensuring the adequacy of the selected safety margins; and, 
•  Evaluating the performance of the trial alternative designs taking into 
consideration the selected performance criteria. 
 
Risk analysis is a major component of the alternative design approval process, 
both for identification of fire scenarios during the preliminary analysis, and during the 
quantitative analysis. The objective is not to build a design with “zero risk”, but to 
achieve safety levels that are at least equivalent to the traditional arrangements.  
 
Likewise the FSA process discussed in the previous chapter, the historical and 
statistical data are also of a great importance, in order to estimate the reliability of the 
system. Also the same techniques, such as “PHA”, “FMECA”, “HAZOP”, and group 
of experts brain storming and judgments are used. Therefore, the FSA framework 
could provide an efficient analysis tool for maritime administrations and other 
approval bodies in charge of the analysis and approval of an innovative design or 
arrangement for maritime fire safety. 
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VI.2.4. Principal Applications of “alternative design and 
arrangements” 
 
The principal applications of “alternative design and arrangements” have, until 
now, mainly concerned passenger ships. A review of the reports related to the subject 
which were submitted to the IMO, allows noticing that three categories of 
arrangements have been introduced as follows: 
 
? Movable fire walls in main vertical zones  
Many cruising ships have “promenades” and “atriums” containing shopping 
centers, public cafees, restaurants and other public spaces. These atriums extend on 
the full length of the ship. However According to SOLAS Convention an A60 
transversal vertical bulkhead is required every 48m in order to divide the ship in main 
vertical zones.  
 
The proposed solution of “Movable fire walls in main vertical zones”, ensure 
the division of the ship in vertical zones, when they are in the closed position, but they 
cannot satisfy other prescriptive requirements, especially related to the “Openings in 
Main Fire Bulkheads”, because of technical and economical feasibility reasons. 
Accordingly, an FSA study of the identified risks have been carried out, which 
included elements such as temperature, smoke, toxicity, visibility and the evacuation 
time. This study allowed generating the necessary recommendations and measures for 
ensuring that the proposed safety levels are equivalent to those specified in SOLAS 
regulation II-2/9.2.2.1 (IMO, 2007b). 
The comparative engineering analysis of the performances shows that the 
alternative design provides safety levels which are equivalent to the traditional design. 
Thus it becomes possible to have a pleasant walk over the entire length of the ship. 
 
? Lift with no separate machinery room 
The SOLAS regulation II-2/9.2.2.5 “Protection of stairways and top spins in 
accommodation area” requires the machinery room to be separated from the lifts 
located within the limits of the stairways. The performance of the alternative 
arrangement was compared with an equivalent prescriptive design, where the 
machinery room is located at the top or in the lower part of the lift cage.  
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The comparative evaluation shows that the alternative design is better than a 
prescriptive design with a top machinery room, and definitely better than a 
prescriptive design with a bottom machinery room (IMO, 2004b), as illustrated in 
Table 8. The alternative design allows, also, making great profits in terms of gained 
space. 
Table 8: Comparison of safety performance for ship’s lifts arrangements 
Commonly used acceptable prescriptive 
designs 
Effect Alternative design 
Machinery room 
above 
Machinery room 
below 
Heat Better Reference Worse 
Smoke Better Reference Worse 
Toxicity Better Reference Worse 
Reduced visibility Better Reference Worse 
Evacuation time Better Reference Worse 
International Maritime Organization. (2004b, December 08). International Convention for the 
Safety of Life At Sea, 1974 – Alternative arrangements accepted under regulation II-2/17 Lift 
with no separate machinery room. (SLS.14/Circ.235). London: Author. 
 
? Class B-15 bulkheads in cabin corridor 
Ship builders try to design cabins, which are increasingly more luxurious, in 
order to satisfy the requests of their customers. In parallel they have to be in 
conformity with prescriptive fire safety requirements, such as SOLAS regulation II-
2/9.2.2.2 related B-15 Bulkheads in cabin corridors. The proposed alternative 
arrangement provide safety levels equivalent to the prescriptive requirement of having 
“continuous B-15 walls and ceiling construction (forming B-15 tunnel)”, and that give 
flexibility to designer for making luxurious designs (IMO, 2007c). 
 
Therefore, it can be argued that these openings within the SOLAS Convention 
which allow designers to conceive innovative fire safety alternatives are still not 
effectively exploited. Mainly three alternatives have been developed, and become 
similar to traditional prescriptive regulations, as they are strictly applied by designers 
on new ships, even though they were developed to deviate from prescriptive 
regulations. Consequently, performance based regulations can be regarded as giving 
the designer the opportunities to develop a new kind of prescriptive regulations that fit 
his conception orientations, and provide equivalent safety levels. 
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VI.3. Goal Based Standards 
VI.3.1. Background 
 
Alternative design and arrangements are made possible under various IMO 
instruments, such as:  
 
• The MARPOL Convention regulations I/5 on equivalence and I/19 related to 
the acceptance of alternative design of oil tanker provided that equivalent 
protection levels against pollution in the event of grounding or collision are 
provided compared to the prescriptive design; 
•  The latest amendments to SOLAS chapters II-1 and III (regulations II-1/55 
and III/38) which will enter into force on 1 July 2010 (IMO, 2006e), related 
respectively to the alternative design and arrangements of machinery and 
electrical installations, and life-saving appliances and arrangements, in 
addition to the previously discussed SOLAS regulation II-2/17 related to the 
alternative fire safety design and arrangements; and finally,  
• Articles 8 and 9 of the International Convention on Load Lines (LL 66) 
respectively related to equivalent arrangements and approvals for 
experimental purposes. 
 
However, the most ambitious development toward a risk-based approach 
philosophy in the design and approval of new ship construction was proposed to the 
78th MSC Committee in February 2004 jointly by Greece, the Bahamas and the IACS. 
This proposal is related to the development of standards for the construction of ships 
entirely based on performance and safety objectives, namely the “Goal-Based 
Standards” (GBS); the accent being placed for the moment on the ships’ structural 
requirements (IMO, 2004c).  
 
It can be argued that this proposal is a fully “proactive initiative” as it has not 
been developed to respond to a particular disaster, but rather to make use of the latest 
scientific tools and theories that promote innovation, and provide flexible and cost-
effective ways of dealing with safety, especially for the knowledge-intensive and 
safety-critical ships. 
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VI.3.2. The five-tier GBS system 
 
The Goal-Based Standards approach has been developed on the basis of a five-
tier system, as illustrated in Figure 20.  The first three tiers constitute the core of the 
concept and consist of: 
 
• Tier I: defining the safety goals to be achieved and controlled during the 
design, construction and the whole life cycle of the ship, in terms of 
environmental performance, structural safety and construction quality. 
• Tier II: identifying functional requirements that will ensure the fulfillment 
of safety goals described in tier I and would represent benchmarks for audits 
of protection against corrosion or structural and residual resistance.  
• Tier III: setting the criteria of checking the conformity with the safety 
objectives-based standards at the stages of design, validation of construction 
and follow-up throughout the service life of the ship, and for the certification.  
 
Tiers IV and V respectively correspond to the technical guidelines and 
procedures developed by the IMO, Administrations and/or Recognized Organizations 
(ROs) for the design of ships to meet Objectives of tiers I and functional requirements 
of Tiers II; and, the industry’s common standards and practices applied during ships’ 
design and construction (Hoppe, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: IMO GBS system  
Papanikolaou, A. & Alissafaki, A.(2005). Introduction to the Goal-Based Standards. 
Thematic Network SAFER EURORO II, Newsletter, 5. Retrieved June 10, 2009, 
from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.safereuroro.org/restricted/SAFER_EURORO_II-Deliverable_D7-
Draft.pdf
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VI.3.3. Recent developments in the GBS system 
 
In February 2009, the IMO published the “Guidelines on approval of risk-
based ship design” for Goal-Based New Ship Construction Standards. This document 
contains general principles, which are intended to be used, by authorities and design 
teams during the process of approval of risk-based designed ships, in all areas of ship 
design. It is also deemed that this document provides a useful tool when dealing with 
the approval of alternative designs and arrangements (IMO, 2009). 
 
More recently, the MSC approved the “international Goal-Based ship 
construction standards for bulk carriers and oil tankers”, and finalized a proposal of 
amendments to SOLAS Chapter II-1 making the application of these Standards 
mandatory, to be considered at the next MSC 87th session, with a view to adoption.  
 
The future amendments would introduce a new SOLAS regulation II-1/3-10 
on “Goal-based ship construction standards for bulk carriers and oil tankers” for oil 
tankers and bulk carriers of 150 m or more. This regulation would require new ships 
to be “designed and constructed for a specified design life, and to be safe and 
environmentally friendly, in intact and specified damage conditions, throughout their 
life” (IMO, 2009).  
 
VI.4. Comments and Conclusions 
 
New safety compliance approaches such as the SOLAS regulation II-2/17 
related to the “alternative design and arrangements” or the “Goal-Based Standards” 
(GBS) constitute a logical result of the initiatives undertaken for reforming the 
maritime safety regulation methodologies, under the new knowledge gained from 
advancement in technology and the great development in the field of risk analysis.  
 
This new approach created a dynamic safety regime, capable of reacting to 
changes in engineering practices and evolving technologies. Thus, the IMO Goals and 
Performance Safety Standards should be sensitive to the technological progress and 
innovation, and also to the changes in public and political risk perception.  
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Thus, the biggest dilemma of the whole process is setting transparent and 
verifiable criteria that reflect the safety goals and performances, during the whole life-
time of the ship. 
  
Moreover, compliance with function and performance-based requirements, 
such as the GBS approach, can be a complex and “knowledge-intensive” process. 
Thus, the monitoring of the design, building and operation stages would require the 
involvement of highly skilled naval architect having adequate risk science knowledge. 
Consequently, the following options occur: 
 
- Maritime Administration would upgrade their manpower, by employing 
highly skilled marine surveyors who have the necessary naval architecture and risk 
management backgrounds, and providing them with new control tools and equipment, 
necessary for the approval and monitoring of innovative safety alternatives. 
Consequently, surveying costs would increase and ship-owners would, probably, 
support these extra-charges; or, 
 
- More responsibility would be delegated to the Classification Societies, 
especially the IACS members, who are major actors behind the development of these 
new proactive safety alternatives. In fact, IACS members already acquired great 
expertise in this field, and have the necessary specialized manpower able to carry out 
this job. Thus, it is much probable that Flag States, which already delegated statutory 
surveys to recognized organizations, would neither monitor new Goal-Based 
Standards, nor endeavor to set performance criteria that fit their real safety objectives, 
but rather place “Blind” confidence on their ROs, with all the possible consequences 
of this process; 
 
An evasive attitude can also be adopted by what can be called by “less 
performing” Flags, which would use these new concepts for attracting “Sub-standard” 
ship-owners, by adopting low safety criteria and delegating the approval and 
monitoring processes of the Goal-Based Standards to “2nd range” ROs. This attitude 
can have dangerous repercussions on the safety levels, as Port State Authorities could 
not refuse safety standards that were approved under Flag State’s criteria.  
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Thus, the whole GBS and performance-based philosophy can be threatened by 
these Flag States, and new instruments should be given to Port State Authorities, such 
as refusing the right to enter their ports to the ships built and operated under the 
Authority of Flag States, which have “non-credible” GBS or alternative arrangements 
approval methodologies.  
 
Consequently, the new proactive safety approaches would require a new 
transparent and auditable surveying regime, which allows ensuring that ships are built 
and operated under reasonable safety standards, during their whole life cycle. This 
initiative will be discussed in the next VIIth Chapter. 
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Chapter VII: Risk-based Ship Inspection Regime 
 
VII.1. Introduction 
 
The move toward a proactive maritime safety regime requires ships to be 
designed, built and operated according to safety goals and objectives. Accordingly, 
the aim of the new safety approach is defining clear performance criteria that can be 
measured, monitored and verified by Flag States, at any time during the whole life 
cycle of the ship.  
 
Thus, designers get the flexibility to introduce concepts with a high degree of 
novelty, and the freedom to benefit from the latest advances in technologies and risk 
analysis theories, which makes today’s ship design complex, and some times ahead of 
the traditional rules and regulations. 
 
Nevertheless, at the last shackle of the safety chain, namely safety inspection 
and surveying regime, ships are still surveyed according to prescriptive requirements, 
dictated by relevant IMO instruments and Classification Rules. However, this 
prescriptive approach does not encourage the analysis of the specific threats to the 
ship’s navigability, the consequences of damage and the risks of structural 
deterioration.  
 
It also does not allow benefiting from good operating practice and managing 
inspection resources to focus on the areas of greatest concern (HSE, 2004). 
Consequently, a more flexible inspection approach using risk concepts for managing 
the ships’ inspection plan, can be considered as an indispensable component of the 
proactive maritime safety philosophy.  
 
Similar to the GBS concept, this conceptual attempt for studying a risk based 
ship inspection regime will be limited to the ships’ structural inspection, and will 
mainly be based on the experienced gained in this field by the nuclear and offshore 
sectors. 
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VII.2. Motivation for Risk Based Inspections 
 
Prescriptive inspections are mainly time-based. The periods of inspection are 
based upon estimation form previous experience and historical data analyzed at the 
time of setting the regulations. For instance, ship’s structures are subject to annual, 
intermediate or special surveys. The scope of these surveys covers the deck, hull 
plating, watertight penetration, cargo and water ballast capacities and special survey 
such as thickness measurements. These surveys are broadly carried out independently 
of the level of risk caused by the failure of each individual element, or the quality of 
ship operational and managerial policy. Also, the outside of the ship’s bottom has to 
be inspected in dry dock twice every 5 years with a maximum period of 36 month 
between two consecutive inspections, without giving consideration neither to the 
trading zone nor to the quality of paints and hull maintenance systems. 
 
Nevertheless, today’s technological advances offer high quality paints that can 
resist for periods greatly exceeding the mandatory 36 months. Further, new 
communication and video systems allow making in-water investigation of probable 
hull damages, for identifying possible failures mechanism of the immerged parts of 
the structure. But ship-owners who adopt these innovative technologies, or implement 
efficient operational and managerial safety policy, do not get any benefits from their 
investments, in terms of flexibility of inspection period.  
 
Thus, it can be argued that the current prescriptive time-based inspection 
regime does not encourage innovation and improvement of the operational and 
managerial performances over the “compliance” levels, as the periods of inspections 
consider a unique empirical value of failure likelihood, which is not influenced by the 
adopted technological or operational systems. 
 
Consequently, the IMO adopted resolution A.744 related to the Enhanced 
Survey Program (ESP) for Bulk Carriers and Oil Tanker (IMO, 1993). This resolution 
can be considered to be a first step forward to improve the efficiency of ships 
structure inspection framework. However, it can not be considered as a risk based 
approach because it only consider the condition of the ship for planning the survey 
cycle independently of other parameters such as operating practices.  
 73
 
Chapter VII: Risk-based Ship Inspection Regime 
Therefore, the efforts of IMO to move toward a proactive inspection regime 
should include the use of risk based methodologies that allow generating rational and 
efficient inspection plan. The progression toward a proactive inspection regime is 
illustrated in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21: Evolution toward proactive Risk-Based Inspection regime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII.3. Theoretic foundations 
 
The purpose of ship’s Risk Based Inspection can be defined as: 
 
Identifying the potential deterioration mechanisms, and threats to the 
navigability of the ship and the integrity of its structure, and assessing the 
likelihood and consequences of potential failures. 
 
This definition comes from the proper definition of the term risk, which is 
mainly a combination of consequences of failure (CoF) and likelihood of failure 
(LoF): 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Risk evaluation for ship inspection 
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Consequently the Risk Based Inspections consist of analyzing the likelihood 
and consequences of a considered failure in order to generate potential failure 
mechanisms that will allow establishing effective inspection plan. These analyses can 
be as follows: 
 
? Likelihood analysis 
 
A Risk Based approaches for managing inspection would offer more flexible 
inspection regime. Particularly, the inspection team would not only be required to 
record specific damages or failures to comply with certain requirements, but also 
would make analysis of specific threats to the hull integrity, identify probable failure 
mechanisms and predict failure likelihood. 
 
Like other risk based concepts, the first step of risk based inspections would 
consist of collecting and analyzing data concerning the considered system, secondly, 
comes the classical HAZID stage, where the different hazards to the ship’s structure 
would be identified, for instance, severe corrosion, cracking, pitting, buckling and 
stress and fatigue failures. 
 
This stage will be followed by the likelihood analysis, in which the likelihood 
ratio for each hazard will be expressed, depending on qualitative and quantitative 
appreciations. This last step will allow generating a likelihood matrix that classifies 
hazards in terms of their probability. An illustrative example is given in Table 12; the 
appreciation differs depending on various factors. The numerical value of the 
likelihood ratio should be dynamic, and revised for any change in the related 
parameters. In fact, likelihood will obviously increase with time because of the 
degradation of time-dependent structure materials. 
 
Table 9: likelihood of various hazards 
Failures Quantitative appreciation Qualitative appreciation 
cracking 0 – 0,70 Low 
buckling 0,70 – 0,85 medium 
corrosion 0,85 – 1,00 high 
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This likelihood analysis will be influenced by various structure related data, 
such as design process information (how close to the limits the structure is initially 
designed), the age of the ship (time accelerates fatigue, corrosion and other damaging 
process), the degree of innovation, the trading zones, the maintenance conditions and 
the operating and managerial expertise of the ship operator. 
 
? Consequence Analysis 
The consequence of failure influence the risks created by each item of the 
ship’s sub-system. Consequently, risk based inspection should consider a thorough 
consequence analysis to establish the ship’s inspection plan. In the shipping sector, 
consequences can be considered in the four following categories: 
• Consequences to human life: fatalities and injuries; 
• Consequences to the environment: oil or noxious substances leakage and 
pollution; 
• Consequences to the ship: costs caused by the damage to the ship’s structure; 
• Consequences to the cargo: costs caused by the damage to the ship’s cargo. 
 
Even though the main objectives of the IMO are the safety of the life and 
protection of the environment, the “efficient shipping” goal, introduced recently, 
emphasizes the importance of the protection of the ship and its cargo. However, these 
parameters make the consequence analysis more complex, as it will be difficult to 
estimate the repair value of the ship, especially when introducing parameters such as 
costs for immobilization or disruption of a trading contract. The complexity of the 
consequences analysis is also increased by the fact that structural failures cause a 
redistribution of forces. i.e. for instance a small initial cracking may progress and lead 
to the failure of considerable portions of the structure because of forces redistribution 
(Basu & Lee, 2006). 
 
Despite these difficulties, consequence analysis methodologies are already 
employed for the development of reliability-based design standards, and performance-
oriented safety criteria, especially after the introduction of GBS methodology. Thus, 
similar concepts can be adopted for the development of the consequence analysis 
methodology related to the risk based inspection framework. 
 76
 
Chapter VII: Risk-based Ship Inspection Regime 
Hence, the consequences of the identified hazards would be classified 
according to their severity using qualitative and quantitative approaches. The levels 
can range from minor, significant, critical to catastrophic consequences. Accordingly, 
the ranking of consequences would be realized depending on the previously identified 
impact categories (namely, the human life, the environment, the ship and its cargo). 
 
Combination of likelihood and consequences 
The combination of the likelihood and consequences analysis, will allow 
generating a risk ranking matrix that permits classifying the various structural 
elements, components and assemblies according to their criticality. Thus, the 
inspection efforts would be more focused on structural elements which represent high 
risk levels, and less finite inspection resources would be used for the areas 
representing lower concern. 
 
VII.4. Application of the risk based inspection approach 
 
 
For the purpose of this application, a midsection of a single skinned bulk 
carrier will be considered. The survey will consider the internal inspection of top side 
and bottom side ballast tanks (respectively the TST and BST), the double bottom 
ballast tanks (DBT), the side shell (SID) and the transversal bulkhead (TRB) (see 
Figure 24).  
The first step will consist of 
gathering data, such as the thickness 
measurements, maintenance program and 
corrosion-prevention methods used inside 
the ballast tanks, the initial structural 
design, and the type of transported cargo. 
Subsequently, this information will be 
combined with statistical data such as the 
historical distribution of the structural hull 
failures area represented in Figure 23 
(IMO, 2001b). This step will allow 
generating likelihood classification of the 
structural regions concerned. 
Hull failure
Side Shell Failure
63%
Failure of deck 
fitting and 
ventilators
4,8%
Hatch cover failure
25,7%
Others
6,5%
 
Figure 23: distribution of hull failures for bulk 
carriers  
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In the second step, the failures consequences are estimated for each area, using 
the four categories of consequences. An illustrative example is given in table 13, 
which reflects only the author’s appreciation of the related failures. 
 
Table 10: Qualitative estimation of hull failures consequences 
Consequence category Area Human life Environment ship cargo 
TST Significant Minor Critical Minor 
BST Critical Critical Critical Significant 
DBT Critical Critical Significant Critical 
SID Catastrophic Critical Catastrophic Catastrophic 
TRB Critical Minor Significant Catastrophic 
 
This consequence weighting illustration will then be combined with the 
likelihood analysis matrix, to draw up a risk ranking table, which allows prioritizing 
the high risk area in the inspection plan. The risk ranking matrix will use weighting 
coefficients, which can be as follows:  
 
Table 11: example of Risk Ranking Matrix 
High 4 5 6 8 
Medium 2 4 5 6 
Low 0 2 4 5 
Minor Significant Critical Catastrophic 
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
 
Consequences 
 
 
The most challenging process, will then be illustrating the risk assessment 
results in an adequate form that would be used for preparing the inspection plan. In 
this process, computer software can be developed in order to generate adequate 
inspection plans in function of the input data that will be entered by the surveyor, 
depending on the risk appreciation of each vessel. 
 
Figure 24: Cross section of a typical single skinned bulk carrier 
TST
BST
DBT
SID
TRB
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VII.5. Benefits of the Risk Based Inspection approach: 
 
The first benefit of adopting a risk based inspection concept, is harmonizing 
the approaches to the various aspects of maritime safety. In fact, the IMO already 
introduced various proactive risk-based approaches for the rule-making framework 
and the ship design and building methodologies. Thus, adopting a risk-based ship 
inspection regime will allow matching the last shackle of the of the maritime safety 
chain, namely ship surveying activity, with the new safety trend. 
 
Secondly, the risk based inspection regime will provide more flexibility to 
ship-owners for planning their inspection periods, and will encourage higher quality 
of managerial and operating procedures, as the investment in these aspects would 
bring benefits in terms of inspection periodicity. Consequently, the inspections will be 
more targeted and the operational constraints better managed, resulting in a more 
optimized and cost effective inspection program, while maintaining the same level of 
safety (Conachey, Serratella & Wang, 2008). 
 
Thirdly, it would allow extending the duration of ship operation between two 
consecutive dry-dockings, since this major maintenance operation will no longer be 
exclusively time-based, but rather rely on various factors, as illustrated in Appendix C. 
 
Fourthly, the risk based inspection approach will allow generating inspection 
data bases that contain historical data on various ship equipment designs, damage 
repairs, inspection findings and failure mechanisms. This data bases will increase both 
the ship operators’ and surveyors’ knowledge of the levels of potential risk posed to 
every ship element. 
 
Moreover, the risk-based inspection would allow meeting the functional 
requirements of the GBS methodology, which aim to monitor the condition of ships to 
ensure that they achieve reasonable safety performance criteria during their whole life 
cycle. 
 
Finally, it can be argued that risk based inspection would increase maritime 
safety, because it allows identifying high risk areas of the ship, and generation 
inspection plans tailored for every particular ship type, operator and condition.  
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VII.5. Chapter’s Conclusions and Recommendations: 
 
Risk based inspection methodologies have been widely used in sensitive 
industries such as nuclear, chemistry and offshore sector over the last decade (ABS, 
2004). The analysis of the latest developments in the maritime safety regime, which is 
moving toward a proactive risk-based approach, allow predicting that the future step 
will be adopting risk based methods to support the traditional prescriptive inspection 
regime. 
 
This new inspection regime will improve the targeting and timing of the 
inspections, and allow generating flexible and cost effective inspection plans, to 
ensure that the condition of ship’s equipment and structure are fit-for-service during 
its whole life-cycle, through the assessment and prediction of potential failure 
mechanism, which supports the IMO GBS objectives. 
 
Finally it is recommended that: 
 
•  The risk based inspection should be initially introduced as recommendation 
for the enhancement of surveys and inspection of ships structures included in 
the safety management system, for the maintenance of ship condition. 
• Crew should be trained for the identification and inspection of ship’s regions 
which have high risk potential. 
• The crew inspection should allow emphasizing the areas of great 
vulnerability, and generating Risk Control Options such as the improvement 
of coating or using corrosion-prevention methods, in order to mitigate failure 
mechanisms. 
• The risk based inspection can then be generalized for the structural 
inspections of ships for classification and statutory purposes. The 
development of computer software and more sophisticated inspection 
equipment would be indispensable for the effective implementation of this 
last step. 
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Chapter VIII: General Conclusions 
 
VIII.1. Review of the Objectives 
 
One of major IMO objectives for the 21st century is developing a proactive 
safety regime that would improve the perceived picture of the whole shipping industry. 
Accordingly, various initiatives were adopted and experimented to ensure that hazards 
are identified as early as possible and are eliminated or mitigated cost effectively. 
These initiatives make that IMO regulations are no more “post-disasters” reactions, 
but also preventive measures against all foreseeable accidents. 
 
The aim of this dissertation was to make an explanatory and exploratory study 
of the different approaches to proactive maritime safety and to investigate the 
contribution of risk science in these approaches.  
 
In other words, the scientific objective was to prove the incentive for 
employing risk management techniques for the proactive maritime safety regulations, 
and to contribute to the demonstration of the adaptability risk-based methodologies to 
the context of maritime safety regulation, and the practical objective was to provide 
an analytical support and to develop a basis of fundamental knowledge, methods and 
techniques using risk-based principles for building a proactive maritime safety regime.  
 
Thus, in the first part, the origins and the importance of the maritime safety 
regulation have been recalled. It was mainly concluded that even if the traditional 
configuration of maritime safety regulations (deterministic and prescriptive) is still a 
major source of maritime safety knowledge, certain limits such as the fragmentation, 
the over-regulation, the perceived incentive for unilateral or regional initiatives and 
the limited innovation capability, justify the necessity for a “wind of change” within 
the IMO rule-making process.  
 
This requirement was also highlighted by reviewing the regulatory approaches 
of other sensitive industries such as the nuclear and offshore sectors, which 
emphasized the contribution of risk science in the evolution of their safety framework.  
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Then the study allowed making a critical review of the methods developed to 
meet the proactive maritime safety objectives and their relation with risk management 
principles. For instance, the FSA framework pre-use risk analysis concept before the 
development of regulations to facilitate the decision-making process, while the 
alternative design and arrangements and Goal-based Standards approaches post-use 
risk assessment principles for setting, evaluating and approving the compliance with 
related safety criteria. Hence, it can be concluded that risk-based methodologies are 
used to respond to the need for a proactive safety regime at multiple levels. 
 
Subsequently, the difficulties faced by the proactive maritime safety initiatives 
were illustrated, for instance the new approach implies that the design of the ship 
becomes based on the quantification of hazards and analysis of historical and 
statistical data from casualty analysis, which are used for modeling the safety 
standards required for the intended ship’s life cycle. However, until now, it is not 
unusual that the required data is still inaccurate mainly because of the absence of 
unified taxonomy and accidental database. Thus, the whole process will generate 
uncertainties, which need to be managed in order to avoid misleading results. 
Fortunately, the harmonization of casualty analysis methodologies and data taxonomy 
is being considered by the IMO, especially after the adoption of the mandatory Code 
of Casualty Investigation. 
 
Moreover, the proactive ship design building framework pose a dilemma with 
regard to ensuring and monitoring that GBS-built ships comply with adequate safety 
criteria at the stages of design, building and during their whole life cycle. Thus, the 
proposed solution was the development of a Risk-Based safety regime, inspired from 
the nuclear and offshore inspection approaches. Accordingly, a first tentative to 
develop such regime was presented, and some difficulties associated with this regime 
were then identified. 
 
Finally, it can be argued that this proactive trend, not only allows achieving 
the IMO safety enhancement objectives, but it also promotes giving to ship designers 
great concept flexibility that encourages innovation, and provides to ship owners more 
cost effective alternatives for matching their commercial goals with effective safety 
objectives. All these arguments pave the way toward a more effective integrated 
shipping industry. 
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VIII.2. Limitations of the research 
 
After reviewing the importance of realized work, it is now essential to present 
the practical difficulties and to clarify the limits of the reviewed methodologies. 
 
First, though the introduction of the risk principles would enable the 
development of a more balanced and flexible legislation, for the design of vessels and 
other equipment and arrangements, it was noted certain reluctance for their 
application. The first reluctance is due to the fact that the risk assessment requires 
structured and costly efforts in the phase of hazards identification, then the second 
reluctance is related to the fact that the experts’ judgment of the qualitative risk 
analysis can be biased, which would greatly influence the study results. Fortunately, 
uncertainties and reluctance are diminishing and confidence is increasing due to the 
progressive generalization of the application of risk-based techniques at the stages of 
rule making and ship design. 
 
Second, the enhancement of application of risk-based techniques within 
maritime safety obviously requires an intensive learning stage. In fact, the use of risk 
based-methods can enlarge the technological and knowledge gap between high-
performance Flag States and classification societies from one side, and more modest 
maritime administration from the other side. Thus, intensive learning and knowledge 
acquisition is indispensible for these maritime administrations to catch the expertise 
and scientific advances reached by other parties and avoid a full delegation of their 
responsibilities to recognized organization. This aspect was not thoroughly covered 
by the scope of the present study. 
   
The limitation of this study is also related to the incorporation of the human 
element for developing safety regulations and setting the safety criteria. Also, the 
benefits provided by the introduction of the ISM Code in the maritime sector for 
building a proactive safety culture were not comprehensively explored. Unfortunately, 
it was not possible to carefully explore these major safety aspects, given the 
importance of a detailed study exclusively dedicated to these subjects.  
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Finally, given the reduced level of maturity of research for the new 
performance and goal based standards in the maritime sector, and the scarcity of the 
published studies on the subject, it was decided that a comparative analysis between 
the application of the goal based and prescriptive standards on board specific ships 
would not provide reliable results. Thus, the research was limited to contrasting the 
theories and objectives of the traditional and new regime, and emphasizing the 
benefits and limitations of these two safety approaches. 
 
VIII.3. Recommendations for further studies 
 
After reviewing the main contributions of the present research and examining 
its limits, it became possible to draw up prospects for future work.  
 
First, risk-based methodologies are used for developing regulations and 
promoting safer and cost effective design for ships covered by IMO instruments. 
Further developments of these methodologies would give great incentive to maritime 
administrations and ship owners to employ these approaches, on voluntary basis, for 
the national rule-making and the design of non-convention vessels. A comprehensive 
study of the applicability of these risk-based safety regimes in a national context, and 
for vessels that are not subject to the application of mandatory IMO instruments 
would provide effective solutions to the safety problems posed by this type of ships.  
 
Second risk based methodologies are distinctly applied at multiple levels of 
the global maritime safety framework, such as rule making, design of safety 
equipment and arrangements, ship building and evaluation of safety criteria. 
Additional in depth studies could determine the feasibility of the harmonization and 
integration of all these risk-based applications for the development of an integrated 
maritime safety framework. 
 
Third, clear and definite risk-based safety criteria setting and monitoring 
framework, and risk perception and acceptability levels identification (such 
transparent methods for setting the ALARP levels) should be deeply investigated, as 
well as their effect on the current safety regime. 
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Fourth, the use of performance and goal based standards should be completed 
by the development universal databases of ship building and safety criteria 
identification. These data bases would be completed by the maintenance and 
inspection records of these ships after the introduction of the predicted risk-based 
maintenance and inspection regimes. 
 
Moreover, the introduction of goal based standards and performance based 
codes is still posing a dilemma with regard to the criteria of their inspection under 
Port State Control (PSC) activity. The author’s opinion is that these risk-based 
designed ships should be inspected under a risk-based Port State Control regime.   
Thus, PSC inspection framework should be developed to meet the new safety trend by 
adopting a proactive risk based safety approach. 
 
Finally, it was presented that Risk Based Inspection has successfully been 
employed in various sensitive industries. In the opinion of the author, these techniques 
can be further developed to be introduced in the maritime sector for the inspection of 
ship structures in a first stage, and then for the survey of various ship safety 
equipment.  
 
The use of these risk-based techniques would also enable engineers to develop 
inspection software, which would make the inspection activity more efficient and less 
time consuming, especially when considering the increasingly bigger ship 
dimensions and the introduction of large double hulled tankers and double skinned 
bulk carriers. 
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Overview of Main Risk Analysis Methods 
 
Risk Analysis 
Methods 
Principles of the method Common Utilization 
Preliminary 
hazard analysis 
(PrHA) 
The PHA technique is a broad, initial 
study that focuses on (1) identifying 
apparent hazards, (2) assessing the 
severity of potential mishaps that could 
occur involving the hazards, and (3) 
identifying means (safeguard) for 
reducing the risks associated with the 
hazards. 
This technique focuses on identifying 
weaknesses early in the life of a system, 
thus saving time and money which might 
be required for major redesign if the 
hazards are discovered at a later date. 
• Most often conducted early in the 
development of an activity or 
system where there is little detailed 
information or operating 
procedures, and is often a precursor 
to further hazard/risk analyses. 
• Primarily used for hazard 
identification and ranking in any 
type system/process. 
 
Preliminary risk 
analysis (PRA) 
PRA is a streamlined mishap-based risk 
assessment approach. The primary 
objective of the technique is to 
characterize the risk associated with 
significant loss scenarios. This team-
based approach relies on subject matter 
experts systematically examining the 
issues. The team postulates combinations 
of mishaps, most significant contributors 
to losses and safeguards. The analysis 
also characterizes the risk of the mishaps 
and identifies recommendations for 
reducing risk. 
• Primarily used for generating risk 
profiles across a broad range of 
activities (e.g., a port-wide risk 
assessment). 
What-if/checklist 
analysis 
What-if analysis is a brainstorming 
approach that uses loosely structured 
questioning to  
(1) postulate potential upsets that may 
result in mishaps or system performance 
problems and (2) ensure that appropriate 
safeguards against those problems are in 
place. 
Checklist analysis is a systematic 
evaluation against pre-established criteria 
in the form of one or more checklists. 
• Generally applicable to any type 
of system, process or activity 
(especially when pertinent 
checklists of loss prevention 
requirements or best practices 
exist). 
• Most often used when the use of 
other more systematic methods 
(e.g., FMEA and HAZOP analysis) 
is not practical. 
Failure Modes 
and Effects 
Analyses 
(FMEA) 
FMEA is an inductive reasoning approach 
that is best suited to reviews of mechanical 
and electrical hardware systems. The 
FMEA technique (1) considers how the 
failure modes of each system component 
can result in system performance problems 
and (2) ensures that appropriate safeguards 
against such problems are in place. A 
quantitative version of FMEA is known as 
failure modes, effects and criticality 
analysis (FMECA). 
• Primarily used for reviews of 
mechanical and electrical systems 
(e.g., fire suppression systems, 
vessel steering / propulsion 
systems). 
• Often used to develop and 
optimize planned maintenance and 
equipment inspection plans. 
• Sometimes used to gather 
information for troubleshooting 
systems. 
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Principles of the method Common Utilization 
HAZard and 
Operability 
(HAZOP) 
analysis 
The HAZOP analysis technique is an 
inductive approach that uses a 
systematic process (using special guide 
words) for (1) postulating deviations 
from design intents for sections of 
systems and (2) ensuring that 
appropriate safeguards are in place to 
help prevent system performance 
problems. 
• Primarily used for identifying 
safety hazards and operability 
problems of continuous process 
systems (especially fluid and thermal 
systems). Also used to review 
procedures and other sequential 
operations. 
Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) 
FTA is a deductive analysis technique 
that graphically models (using Boolean 
logic) how logical relationships 
between equipment failures, human 
errors and external events can combine 
to cause specific mishaps of interest. 
• Generally applicable for almost 
every type of analysis application, but 
most effectively used to address the 
fundamental causes of specific system 
failures dominated by relatively 
complex combinations of events. 
• Often used for complex electronic, 
control or communication systems. 
Event Tree 
Analysis (ETA) 
ETA is an inductive analysis technique 
that graphically models (using decision 
trees) the possible outcomes of an 
initiating event capable of producing a 
mishap of interest. 
• Generally applicable for almost 
every type of analysis application, but 
most effectively used to address 
possible outcomes of initiating events 
for which multiple safeguards (lines 
of assurance) are in place as 
protective features. 
• Often used for analysis of vessel 
movement mishaps and propagation 
of fire/explosions or toxic releases. 
Relative 
Ranking/Risk 
Indexing 
Relative ranking/risk indexing uses 
attributes of a vessel, shore facility, 
port or waterway to calculate index 
numbers that are useful for making 
relative comparisons of various 
alternatives (and in some cases can be 
correlated to actual performance 
estimates). 
• Extensively used to establish 
priorities for boarding and inspecting 
foreign flagged vessels. 
• Generally applicable to any type of 
analysis situation (especially when 
only relative priorities are needed) as 
long as a pertinent scoring tool exists. 
Coarse Risk 
Analysis (CRA) 
CRA uses operations/evaluations and 
associated functions for accomplishing 
those operations/evolutions to describe 
the activities of a type of vessel or 
shore facility. Then, possible deviations 
in carrying out functions are postulated 
and evaluated to characterize the risk of 
possible mishaps, to generate risk 
profiles in a number of formats and to 
recommend appropriate risk mitigation 
actions. 
• Primarily used to analyze (in some 
detail) the broad range of 
operations/evolutions associated with 
a specific class of vessel or type of 
shore facility. 
• Analyses can be performed for a 
representative vessel/facility within a 
class or may be applied to specific 
vessels/facilities. 
• Especially useful when risk-based 
information is sought to optimize 
field inspections for classes of 
vessels/facilities. 
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Pareto analysis Pareto analysis is a prioritization 
technique based solely on historical 
data that identifies the most significant 
items among many. This technique 
employs the 80-20 rule, which states 
that ~80 percent of the problems 
(effects) are produced by ~20 percent 
of the causes. 
• Generally applicable to any type of 
system, process or activity (as long as 
ample historical data is available). 
• Most often used to broadly 
characterize the most important risk 
contributors for more detailed 
analysis. 
Root cause 
analysis 
• Event charting 
• 5 Whys 
technique 
• Root Cause 
Map 
Root cause analysis uses one or a 
combination of analysis tools to 
systematically dissect how a mishap 
occurred (i.e., identifying specific 
equipment failures, human errors and 
external events contributing to the 
loss). Then, the analysis continues to 
discover the underlying root causes of 
the key contributors to the mishap and 
to make recommendations for 
correcting the root causes. 
• Generally applicable to the 
investigation of any mishap or some 
identified deficiency in the field. 
• Event charting is most commonly 
used when the loss scenario is 
relatively complicated, involving a 
significant chain of events and/or a 
number of underlying root causes. 
• 5 Whys is most commonly used for 
more straightforward loss scenarios. 
• Root Cause Map is used in 
conjunction with any root cause 
analysis to challenge analysts to 
consider a range of possible root 
causes. 
Change analysis Change analysis systematically looks 
for possible risk impacts and 
appropriate risk management strategies 
in situations in which change is 
occurring (e.g., when system 
configurations are altered, when 
operating practices/policies changes, 
when new/different activities will be 
performed). 
• Generally applicable to any 
situation in which change from 
normal configuration/operations/ 
activities is likely to significantly 
affect risks (e.g., marine events in 
ports/waterways). 
• Can be used as an effective root 
cause analysis method as well as a 
predictive hazard/risk analysis 
method 
Common Cause 
Failure Analysis 
(CCFA) 
CCFA is a specialized approach for 
systematically examining sequences of 
events stemming from the conduct of 
activities and/or operation of physical 
systems that cause multiple 
failures/errors to occur from the same 
root causes, thus defeating multiple 
layers of protection simultaneously. 
• Exclusively used as a supplement 
to a broader analysis using another 
technique, especially fault tree and 
event tree analyses. 
• Best suited for situations in which 
complex combinations of 
errors/equipment failures are 
necessary for undesirable events to 
occur. 
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Human error 
analysis 
• Error-likely 
situation 
analysis 
• Walkthrough 
analysis 
• Guide word 
analysis 
• Human 
reliability 
analysis 
•  
Human error analysis involves a range 
of analysis methods from simple 
human factors checklist through more 
systematic (step-by-step) analyses of 
human actions to more sophisticated 
human reliability analyses. These tools 
focus on identifying and correcting 
error-likely situations that set people up 
to make mistakes that lead to mishaps. 
• Generally applicable to any type of 
activity that is significantly dependent 
on human performance. 
• Error-likely situation analysis is the 
simplest approach and is used as a 
basic level of analysis for human 
factors issues. 
• Walkthrough and guide word 
analyses are used for more systematic 
analyses of individual procedures. 
• Human reliability analysis is used 
for special applications in which 
detailed quantification of human 
reliability performance is needed. 
 
Source: American Bureau of Shipping. (2000). Guidance Notes on Risk Assessment 
Applications for the Marine and Offshore Oil and Gas Industries. New York: 
Author 
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Figure 25: IMO Flowchart of the FSA methodology 
 
International Maritime Organization. (2007, May 14). Formal Safety  assessment - 
Consolidated text of the Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in 
the IMO rule-making process (MSC/Circ.1023−MEPC/Circ.392). (MSC 83/INF.2). 
London: Author. 
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Figure 26: Comparison between RISK-based and RULE-based hull 
inspections. 
 
Source: Lee, A.K., Serratella, C., Wang, G. & Basu, R. (2006). Flexible 
Approaches to Risk-Based Inspection of FPSOs. Houston: Offshore Technology 
Conference. Retrieved May 7, 2009, from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.otcnet.org/2006/tech prog/sched/documents/otc183641.pdf
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Figure 27: Main Steps in the development of an RBI Program 
 
American Bureau of Shipping. (2003). Guide for Surveys Using Risk-Based 
Inspection for the Offshore Industry. New York: Author 
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Table 12: Pros and Cons of Qualitative and Quantitative Risk Analysis 
Techniques 
 
 
Qualitative Analysis Quantitative Analysis 
Pros Cons Pros Cons 
Captures expertise 
of persons most 
familiar with 
facility. 
Need time 
commitment from 
qualified persons. 
Can generate 
results based on 
existing data. 
Need to determine 
which models to 
use and how they 
will be integrated 
with each other. 
Can quickly screen 
out equipment or 
structures with no 
damage 
mechanisms or with 
low consequence of 
failure. 
May fail to 
consider all failure 
mechanisms in all 
modes of operation, 
especially 
combination of 
failures. 
Requires less time 
on part of experts 
during the 
analysis. 
Expensive to build 
and maintain, may 
require software 
support. 
Can be less costly 
than quantitative 
analysis. 
Results may be 
difficult to defend 
to third party 
Becomes less 
costly with 
experience in use 
of models. 
May be high cost 
on initial studies. 
Can be faster than 
quantitative study. 
Inconsistent results, 
care must be taken 
to provide audit 
trail. 
Consistent results, 
auditable, 
perception of 
accuracy. 
Accuracy depends 
on data availability 
and accuracy. 
 
American Bureau of Shipping. (2003). Guide for Surveys Using Risk-Based 
Inspection for the Offshore Industry. New York: Author 
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